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NOTES
THE MICHIGAN SINGLE BUSINESS TAX ACT:
A BLUEPRINT FOR OHIO?
O N AUGUST 27, 1975, THE MICHIGAN SINGLE BUSINEss TAX Acr
(SBTA) took effect.' The SBTA, in conjunction with several other
acts, 2 represented a comprehensive effort by the Michigan legislature
to revise the scheme for the taxation of business activity within the state.
This note will explore some of the major provisions of the SBTA,
focusing upon those areas Michigan has treated in a manner different
from that of other states. Initially, the various types of state business
taxes will be introduced. Each tax's strengths and weaknesses will be
explored so that the SBTA can be evaluated in relation to the other types
of taxes the Michigan legislature might have chosen. Next, the note will
address the problem of the allocation of income of multistate busi-
nesses. There are also the questions of how to define "taxable income"
and the "persons" to be taxed. The SBTA responds to those questions
with new and very different concepts. Finally, the strengths and weak-
nesses of the SBTA in each of these areas will be compared with the
Ohio scheme of business taxation3 and, to some extent, the federal in-
come tax. Hopefully, this comparison will reveal some of the deficiencies
in the Ohio tax4 and, ultimately, answer the question of whether or not
a tax such as the SBTA is suitable for use in Ohio and other states.5
I MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 208.1-.145 (Supp. 1976). Though Michigan acts gener-
ally take effect on the date specified in the act, the Governor can order that it take immedi-
ate effect upon his approval, 21087 MICH. Ar'y GEN. 364 (1941-42), as was done in this
case, MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 208.145 (Supp. 1976).
2 MICH. CoM. LAws ANN. §§ 205.131-.144 (Supp. 1976) (property owned by persons
subject to SBTA exempted from the intangibles tax); id. §§ 450.304-.310 (repealed the
state franchise fee for corporations); id. §§ 489.842, .852, .879 (repealed privilege tax on
savings and loan associations); id. §§ 500.448-.449 (repealed privilege tax on insurance
companies); Mich. Pub. Acts of 1975, No. 232 (codified in scattered portions of MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 206 (Supp. 1976)) (repealed the income tax on corporations and
financial institutions; individuals, estates, and trusts that remain subject to the income tax
are allowed a credit for any SBTA tax paid); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.9c (Supp.
1976) (exempted inventories from the general property tax); id. § 207.5a (excluded mate-
rials and supplies from the definition of "property" for the purposes of the general property
tax).
I Ohio imposes a tax on corporations under OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733 (Page Supp.
1976).
4 At least one author has recognized that Ohio and Michigan are in direct competition
for new industry and that the scheme of taxation may determine which state can attract
more industry over the long run. Ward, A C.P.A. Examines Michigan's Tax Structures,
34 MICH. ST. B.J. 34, 40 (Jan. 1955).
In addition to being in close proximity to each other, Ohio and Michigan are very sim-
ilar in population, urbanization, personal income, manufacturing, and other statistical
characteristics. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AnSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 12, 19, 380-81, 730, 731 (1974).
' While the constitutionality of the SBTA is beyond the scope of this note, there have
been so many challenges to state taxes that some introduction is necessary. The early
constitutional challenges usually focused on whether the state had the power to tax at all,
e.g., Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. DeBolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1853); Robertson v.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE STATE TAXATION OF BUSINESS
A. The Types of State Business Taxes
It is perhaps trite to note that state legislatures have become re-
markably proficient at devising new methods to tax their state's busi-
nesses. Real property, personal property, intangibles, organization,
franchise, gross receipts, and income taxes are all commonplace. Un-
fortunately, most of these taxes were imposed to raise revenue rather
than out of a desire to enact an orderly plan for the taxation of business.
If, however, a state legislature were considering the repeal of existing
business taxes and the imposition of one well-designed tax, how would
it select the one to be used? It would seem that the theoretical bases
of various taxes should be compared first, to find the ones that are most
equitable. Practical considerations such as efficiency of administration
and ability to raise revenue will then help to sharpen the analysis.
In 1776, Adam Smith set forth four maxims by which taxes may be
evaluated. Though two-hundred years old, they still provide general
practical and theoretical ideals against which almost any type of tax
can be evaluated. The first, equality, means that the tax should be
proportionate to the income of the taxpayer. The second, certainty,
requires that the taxpayer have advance knowledge of when and how a
tax will be levied. Convenience of payment is the third maxim. Fourth
is economy of collection and enforcement.'
Legislatures have a wide variety of business taxes available for their
use. They can tax what the business owns (property, either tangible
or intangible); what it receives (gross receipts); what it earns (income);
Commissioner of State Land Office, 44 Mich. 274, 6 N.W. 659 (1880); whether the statute
has been applied equally and uniformly, Cummings v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 101 U.S.
153 (1879); or whether imposition of the tax results in double taxation, Leader v. Glander,
149 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E.2d 69 (1948); Shapero v. Department of Revenue, 322 Mich. 124,
33 N.W.2d 729 (1948). More recently, taxpayers have questioned whether a state can
tax businesses in interstate commerce, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Note, Developments in the Law: Federal Limitations on
State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 956-71 (1962), and if so, how
the activities of multistate businesses are to be allocated to a particular state for tax pur-
poses, Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circum-
scription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 487 (1968).
An overview of the development and resolution of these challenges is provided in two
casebooks. J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION - CASES AND MATERIALS 36-69
(3d ed. 1969); 0. OLDMAN & F. SCHoETILE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND FINANCE - TEXT,
PROBLEMS AND CASES 51-68 (1974).
The effect of the Michigan Constitution on the SBTA is discussed in note 77 infra.
6 A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1937). In recent years the first of thsr .maxims,
equality, has become the focal point for the discussion of taxes. It can be broken down
into two subgroups - vertical equality (progressive, regressive, or neutral taxation) and
horizontal equality (among groups, classes, industries, regions, etc.). The emerging test
in the area has become "ability-to-pay." The policy is that everyone should eont;ibute in
relation to their ability to pay. It is only fair to expect one to pay what he re":,it,ibly can
pay out of his current income, even if that is less than a per capita allocation of the costs
would require. The practical problem with the theory is that it precludes almost every
form of taxation other than an income tax. Only an income tax measures one's ability to
pay over a given period of time, given that taxes are to be paid out of current income.
Other taxes, especially property taxes, are often levied irrespective of ability to pay in a




its net worth (certain franchise taxes); the value it adds to the economy
(value-added taxes); and even its very right to exist (organization taxes
and certain minimum-payment franchise taxes) .7
Each of these types of taxes can be evaluated in light of Smith's
maxims;" however, because of their deficiencies some of them may be
dismissed rather quickly. In its pure form, the value-added tax is rela-
tively unknown in the United States. Though it has some theoretical
appeal, legislatures' unfamiliarity with it, and its disputed effectiveness
in the countries presently using it, have not made this a viable alterna-
tive.9 Organization and minimum-payment taxes have limited appeal
because of their limited revenue-raising abilities. 10 The property tax,
though probably the oldest form of taxation, has been the subject of
loud and persistent criticism on both practical and theoretical grounds.'1
In recent years, it has become the primary financing tool of local gov-
ernments, 12 and state governments appear to have abandoned its wide-
spread use. Furthermore, whatever the tax's weaknesses in general, it
seems to be especially deficient in raising revenue from businesses. 13
Having eliminated the above taxes as alternatives, a legislature seek-
ing to tax businesses would be left with gross receipts, franchise, and
I Some theorists would add sales taxes to this list. They have been excluded here be-
cause they are taxes imposed upon the customer, not the business. Nevertheless, some
economists argue that the true incidence of the taxes is upon the business, not the cus-
tomer. D. MORGAN, Sales and Income Taxes, in STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE 116-19
(W. Mitchell & I. Walter ed. 1970).
s There is extensive literature making such comparisons covering the economic, po-
litical, business, and legal viewpoints. Some introduction to it will be provided in the dis-
cussion of each type of tax.
I It is interesting to note, however, that Michigan was one state that enacted a modi-
fied value-added tax. It was the Business Activities Tax, codified in MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 205.551-574 (1967), in effect from 1953-67. An introduction to value-added
taxation and the Michigan tax is Barnes, The Business Receipts Tax, 32 MIcH. ST. B.J.
31 (Oct. 1953). A more esoteric development of value-added taxes is R. WAGNER, R.
FREEMAN, C. MCCLURE, N. TuRE & E. SCHIFF, PERSPECTIVES ON TAX REFORM - DEATH
TAXES, TAX LOOPHOLES AND THE VALUE-ADDED TAX 165-316 (1974).
10 States generally seek to keep organization taxes low in order to attract new industry.
Even if they were higher, they provide only a one-time source of revenue. Minimum-
payment taxes (usually imposed on corporations in the form of a minimum franchise
tax) must be set low enough to attract new industry and not to preclude the corporate
form of organization for small businesses.
11 The literature discussing property tax reform and relief constitutes the largest por-
tion of literature about this type of tax. E.g., D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY
TAX (1966); D. PAUL, THE POLITIcs OF THE PROPERTY TAX (1975). STATE AND LOCAL
FINANCE 364 (W. Mitchell & I. Walter ed. 1970) contains an extensive bibliography of the
literature prior to 1970.
2 See D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 9-10 (1966).
13 If the property tax were the sole means of taxation, there would be hundreds of busi-
nesses that would pay relatively little tax. Any company or industry with little or no
property would pay little or no tax regardless of its income or ability to pay (e.g., law of-
fices). On the other hand, companies with many plants or large amounts of equipment
would be heavily taxed irrespective of ability to pay (e.g., utilities, real estate holding
companies). Because of this problem, the property tax on businesses is especially vulner-
able to attack on the basis of Smith's equality maxim. Most of the property tax reform
literature deals with the equality problem. Recently, however, certainty and economy of
collection have become a problem as well. This has been due to the frequent property
value reassessments necessitated by rapidly changing land values.
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income taxes as the remaining choices. A tax on the gross receipts1 4
of businesses can be criticized on the ground of Smith's first maxim,
equality. The tax falls heavily on certain types of businesses1 5 without
regard for their ability to pay.16 Since it probably meets Smith's other
maxims as well as the income tax, 7 perhaps it has been this lack of
equality that has made the gross receipts tax a rarity. 8
The second most popular form for the taxation of businesses is the
capital value or franchise tax.' 9 These taxes assume various forms2
but most have one thing in common - they are aimed at the equity sec-
tion of the corporate balance sheet.2' They seek to tax the capital of
the corporation.
14 As used in this note, a gross receipts tax is a tax based on the gross receipts of the
business. It is distinguished from a sales tax, which is also based on gross receipts, but
is paid by the purchaser of the business' goods rather than the business itself. The terms
gross receipts tax and sales tax are often used interchangeably, especially in statutes, but
they represent distinct concepts.
I- An example will suffice. Taxpayer A operates a high-volume, low profit margin
business, and B deals in low volume with a high profit margin, both selling identical
products. Each has no overhead, generates the same net profit before state taxes and
faces a 5% gross receipts tax. Their income statements for 19X1 appear thus:
A B
$500,000 Sales $100,000
450,000 Cost of Goods Sold 50,000
- 50,000 Profit 50,000
25,000 Gross Receipts Tax @ 5% 5,000
$ 25,000 Profit After Tax $ 45,000
Both have an equal ability to pay (profit before tax), both have contributed the same
profit to the state's economy and yet A, by virtue of the nature of his operation, pays a
significantly higher tax. The fairness problem is patent. Not only does this type of tax
discourage the development of individual companies similar to A, it falls especially heavily
on certain industries that operate as A does, e.g., supermarkets and discount retailers.
Papke, Indiana Tax Policy: Revision, Reform, Reconstruction, 17 NAT'L TAX J. 113,
115-23 (1964) gives a more detailed critique of gross receipts taxes from an economist's
point of view.
16 The concept of ability to pay is developed as a part of Smith's equality maxim in
note 6 supra.
17 Regarding determination, collection, and enforcement, the income and gross receipts
taxes are very similar. Both rely on selective enforcement and self-assessment.
Is Only seven states impose a true gross receipts tax. See P-H STATE AND LOCAL
TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 200 (1976). A number of other states impose such taxes but
only on certain industries, principally public utilities.
19 38 states presently impose a tax on the privilege of being or of operating a corpora-
tion within the state. See P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 101 (1975).
20 Frequent bases for the tax are Capital Stock, Paid-in Capital and Retained Earnings,
in various combinations. These are discussed very generally in P-H STATE AND LOCAL
TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 92,280-318 (1965).
21 It is interesting to note that franchise taxes were developed at a time when corpora-
tions were valued for investment purposes by their balance sheet values. As security
analysts became more sophisticated and as inflation distorted the balance sheet, the focus
for valuation became the income statement. Today, security analysts value the corporation
almost wholly on its earning capacity with little regard for balance sheet values, except
in a liquidation situation. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTrLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS -
PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 434-37 (4th ed. 1962). By the early 1940's, courts recognized




Like the gross receipts tax, the franchise tax's major theoretical fail-
ing is its lack of equality.22  It taxes certain businesses more heavily
because of the form and structure of the corporation and the require-
ments of the industry. Thus, when this tax is large enough to be signifi-
cant, the form and structure of the corporation become the focus of the
company's tax planners.2 3  Those businesses which, because of business
or industry constraints, are restricted to certain forms or structures, 24
must pay the tax without regard for their ability to pay. Furthermore,
the franchise tax has certain practical problems. By its nature and in
practice, the tax cannot be effectively levied against unincorporated
businesses which, in most states, represent a lucrative tax base.
25
Additionally, unless the tax is carefully designed, it may not share in
the growth of the corporation and thus, the tax base may erode during
inflationary periods.26  The bases upon which the tax is usually de-
fended are theoretically questionable in light of the operation of the
modem corporation.2 7
Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 525-27 (1941), however, even in the 1970's the states are still
taxing the balance sheet (franchise taxes) rather than the income statement.
22 The concepts of equality and ability to pay are developed in note 6 supra.
23 Some indication of how businesses have been able to avoid the tax is shown by
P-H STATE AND LocAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 92,220-242 (1965).
24 The burden of franchise taxes is especially heavy on those corporations which are
equity financed rather than debt financed. Those that are debt financed have propor-
tionately less equity and, thus, a smaller franchise tax base. Utilities are frequently
organized in this fashion. For those businesses which must be equity financed, due to
the nature of the business, the franchise tax is an unavoidable burden. These businesses
usually have little debt financing because of a lack of physical assets to secure such debt.
Service industries and small businesses in general are examples. The economic problems
in taxing net worth (equity) are developed in Thurow, Net Worth Taxes, 25 NAT'L TAX J.
417 (1972).
25 Entire industries are dominated by unincorporated businesses. Law firms and real
estate holding companies are examples.
26 A franchise tax levied solely on Capital Stock and Paid-in Capital may have the
same tax base throughout the life of the corporation if the corporation never issues any
additional stock. The state only shares in the growth of the corporation to the extent of
new stock issued. Income taxes, on the other hand, participate in the growth to the ex-
tent of increased profits, even if those profits are only the result of inflated price levels.
Broader based franchise taxes that include Retained Earnings in the tax base may share
in the growth of the corporation, depending on the tax's structure and the company's
policy on dividend payments.
The responsiveness of state taxes to economic growth is not easily determined be-
cause of the peculiarity of each state's taxes. One study did note, however, that Michi-
gan's corporation taxes were particularly unresponsive to economic growth. See Legler
& Shapiro, The Responsiveness of State Tax Revenue to Economic Growth, 21 NAT'L TAX
J. 46, 51 (1968). Interestingly, the study covered the years 1945-64, when Michigan did
not have a true corporate income tax, but had several other forms of taxation. See notes
73-81 infra and accompanying text.
27 The franchise tax is frequently defended on the grounds that it provides assured
revenues in the face of a failing economy, when the revenues from an income tax would
fall as profits fell. This depends on the structure of the tax and its responsiveness to
changes in the state's economy. See Legler & Shapiro. The Responsiveness of State Tax
Revenue to Economic Growth, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 46, 51 (1968). If the franchise tax is less
responsive to growth in the state's economy, it would follow that its base would )robably
not erode as quickly in a failing economy. There appears to be a trade-off involved here.
If the tax is more responsive to growth in the economy, it follows that the base will prob-
ably erode more rapidly in a failing economy. Conversely, less responsive taxes, such as
1976]
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Because of some or all of the deficiencies in the other forms of busi-
ness taxation, the income tax has become the most popular. 2  While
35 states still impose a franchise tax along with an income tax,2 9 12
states, Michigan being the latest to follow suit, impose the income tax
alone.30 The Michigan approach is noteworthy because the legislature,
in reconsidering the entire business taxation scheme, voted to repeal the
franchise tax and to rely principally on the income-based SBTA.3 1 What,
then, is the appeal of an income tax?
Perhaps the basic theoretical appeal of the income tax lies in its
equality for the business taxpayer. An income tax pays no heed to
business form or structure, how much capital or property it owns, or
the nature or amount of its gross receipts. The tax asks only one ques-
tion: How much can this business contribute from current income to
defray the cost of running the state? It answers with a fixed per-
centage of net income levied on every business irrespective of the factors
just mentioned. In its pure form, it taxes solely on the basis of ability
to pay. Furthermore, it taxes at the same rate whether the business is
incorporated or unincorporated.3 2 Thus, it appears the income tax meets
Smith's equality maxim because of its adherence to the ability to pay
principle.33
The income tax also appears to meet Smith's certainty and con-
venience of payment maxims. It is doubtful that any modern tax would
fail the certainty test in the context in which Smith developed it. 34
the franchise tax, will probably remain more stable during periods of growth or recession
(assuming it is true that the franchise tax is, in fact, less responsive). However, this
"stickiness" of the franchise tax further accentuates its lack of regard for ability to pay.
As the economy falters and firms make less money, the tax continues at high levels de-
spite the change in ability to pay.
Other defenses of the franchise tax are that corporations should pay for the use of state
services and for the privilege of holding the franchise. There are only two times during
the corporation's existence when there is necessarily a direct use of the state's services: at
the corporation's inception and at dissolution. The franchise tax burden bears no rela-
tionship to either of these events. The policy of taxing the privilege of holding the fran-
chise is inconsistent with legislatures' policy of granting the "privilege" as freely as pos-
sible in order to attract new business to the state. Both of these justifications for the tax
seem to belie the tax's true purpose - to raise revenues.
28 Forty-six states now impose a corporate income tax. See P-IL STATE AND LOCAL
TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 101 (1975).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 A wide variety of taxes were repealed with the passage of the SBTA leaving it the
primary business-oriented tax. See note 2 supra.
32 The imposition of a state income tax on unincorporated businesses is still relatively
rare. Michigan, however, under the SBTA, does impose a tax on these entities. See notes
155-59 infra and accompanying text.
31 See note 6 supra.
14 With the wide publicity given to tax statutes and the enormous amount of literature
on all types of taxes, one could conceivably compute any tax liability. The complexity of
the computations is another question. If Smith's certainty maxim were read to require
that every taxpayer know its liability precisely, the income tax would probably fail because
of its complexity. However, there is nothing inherent in an income tax that requires coin-
plexity. It could be very simple; it is for political, economic, and administrative reasons
that the income tax is complicated by additional provisions. See J. CHOMMIE, THE LAW




The convenience of the income tax derives from its method of payment,
that is, either quarterly 5 or annually along with the other expenses
of the business. Again, however, most modem taxes would probably
meet the convenience of payment test.
36
The income tax meets the economy of collection maxim as well as
or better than other taxes, because it is based on self-assessment. In
theory, each taxpaying entity computes its own tax and remits it to the
state. Unlike the property tax, which requires assessment and billing
by the state before the taxpayer pays, the income tax requires no action
on the part of the state to initiate the collection process.
37
The income tax's one failing is an economy of enforcement. It is
very difficult to locate every income-generating business that should be
paying taxes to the state. Many of them are simply too small or have
so little contact with the state that their existence is difficult to determine.
Often those subject to the income tax will not register with the state
because they make only occasional sales within the state. In this re-
spect, the property and franchise taxes are clearly superior. The prop-
erty tax is superior because it is virlually impossible to acquire or hold
land without recording it with the state. Likewise, for business and
non-tax legal reasons, virtually all corporations covered by the franchise
tax will register with the state, thereby subjecting themselves to the tax.
Thus, on the whole, the business income tax appears to meet Smith's
maxims better than any other viable means of taxation. Its one defi-
ciency, difficulty of enforcement, is outweighed by its clear superiority in
meeting the maxim of equality.
B. The Problems of Multistate Income Allocation
During the 1950's, the individual states began to levy taxes on busi-
ness income. This immediately raised the question of how businesses
which operated in more than one state were to allocate their income
among the states. The question was litigated,38 legislation was intro-
duced in Congress, 39 and a uniform law was adopted,40 yet there was
3- Quarterly estimated tax payments are required by the SBTA. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 208.71 (Supp. 1976).
36 Most taxes require only a single payment to a single taxing authority either an-
nually, semi-annually, or quarterly.
3" There is little conclusive, empirical evidence on the cost of collection and compliance
with state taxes. The property tax probably places most of the burden on the state (valu-
ation, assessment, billing, and collection), while the income tax places it on the taxpayer
(self-assessment and selective enforcement). One study of the cost of compliance con-
cluded that in Montana the total costs for income and property taxes were roughly equal.
Wicks & Killworth, Administrative and Compliance Costs of State and Local Taxes, 20
NAT'L TAX J. 309, 315 (1967).
38 The litigation culminated in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450 (1959), which held that states could apportion the income of, and levy
taxes upon, the interstate activities of multistate businesses if the taxes imposed were
non-discriminatory and the apportionment had a reasonable relationship to the busi-
nesses' activities in the taxing state.
39 A brief and informative history of the development of the allocation problem,
including major legislative proposals, is provided in P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL
STATES UNIT 5100 (1968).
40 UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES Acr, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 365
1976]
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no satisfactory answer to the problem. Finally, in 1967, the Multistate
Tax Compact (MTC)41 was developed 2 and 36 states presently sub-
scribe to it.43 Since the MTC's adoption and general acceptance, the
question of income allocation has not enjoyed the notoriety it once did,
though there is still some discussion of the practical aspects of its
application.
Literature on multistate income allocation is plentiful 44 and it is not
the purpose of this note to add to it. Rather, a brief introduction to the
MTC, its problems and advantages, will be presented. Specific reference
can then be made to the Michigan and Ohio statutes to show how those
states have resolved the allocation problem.45
It is important to note that deviations from the MTC must be closely
examined in view of the need for uniformity among the states in order
to be fair to the taxpayer. The results of inconsistent or incorrect alloca-
tion of multistate business income are easily illustrated. 46  The obvious
result is that if too much or too little taxable income is allocated to a
particular state, it will have a larger or smaller tax base than is con-
sistent with the taxpayer's level of business operations within the state.
Clearly, with a wide range of allocation methods available, legislatures
would be inclined to adopt the one providing the largest tax base for
(1970) [hereinafter cited as UDITPA]. The Act was approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1957, but
has met with limited success. Only twelve states have adopted it. 7 UNIFOflM LAWS ANN.
258 (Supp. 1976).
41 The MTC subsumed the UDITPA and provided a comprehensive scheme of alloca-
tion with a detailed set of regulations and procedures for changing them. The MTC is
administered by the Multistate Tax Commission, whose duties and powers are defined
by the Act itself. The current version of the Act is contained in P-H STATE AND LOCAL
TAXES, ALL STATES UNrr 1 6310-68 (1976). The regulations are found at id. 5820-
6286.
42 See note 39 supra.
41 P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 5150, 5151 (1976). Fourteen
of the thirty-six states are "associate members." They are distinguished by the fact that
they do not have a voting membership on the Multistate Tax Commission. Nevertheless,
all 36 states substantially follow the MTC. Illinois and New York, both members at one
time, have withdrawn. Id.
44 A series of six articles collected in 18 Oumo ST. L.J. 1-104 (1957) shows the breadth
of the allocation problem. An overview of the whole area and an introduction to the now
prevalent three-factor formula is presented in Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Corporate
Income for State Tax Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltum, id. at 84.
The three-factor formula is based on the concept of a "unitary business" as discussed
in Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HAST. L.J. 42
(1960); Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and
Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171 (1970); Wahrhaftig, Allocation Factors
in Use in California, 12 HAST. L.J. 65 (1960). A critique of the unitary business theory is
Miller, State Taxation of Multiple Corporations and Multiple Businesses, 49 TAXES 102
(1971).
45 The federal government need not deal with the allocation problem since it taxes all
United States income regardless of the state wherein it was earned. It does, however, face
a conceptually similar problem in dealing with taxpayers with income from foreign coun-
tries.
46 The illustrations herein are an expansion of the points raised in Wilkie, A Basis for
Taxing Corporate Net Income, 36 TAXES 807, 808-09 (1958). See also Pierce, Uniform





their state. While this would undoubtedly be beneficial to the particular
state, it can result in a given taxpayer being subjected to several states'
taxes disproportionate to its operations within those states and on more
than 100% of its income.47 Thus, whatever method is chosen, all states
should subscribe to it. In this way, each state is assured of receiving
the revenue it deserves, and 100% of the taxpayer's income will be sub-
ject to taxation, but no more. Of course, this requires that the individual
states compromise their desire to maximize their revenues in order to be
fair to the individual taxpayer.
In addition, the prevalence of interstate commerce raises the ques-
tion: Should the income of businesses engaging in interstate commerce
be taxed where the sale originates; where it is completed; in states
through which the goods pass; or where the company maintains its head-
quarters? All of these locations provide a legitimate basis for a state to
tax income. As illustrated, the income of a single interstate business
could be fully taxed in at least four states resulting in the business pay-
ing tax on 400% of its income from a particular transaction. Since it is
obvious that the taxpayer should be taxed on 100% of its interstate in-
come, but no more, income should be allocated among the states in some
reasonable fashion.
The lack of a uniform system also leads to overly burdensome re-
porting requirements and consequently high administrative costs. The
multistate taxpayer must comply with as many as 51 systems of alloca-
tion, each with its own forms, reports, and regulations. Additionally,
the taxpayer is motivated to plan its business activities to lessen the total
impact of state taxes by "allocating" the largest part of its income to the
state which will tax it least. The need for such efforts would be reduced
if all states adopted the same allocation method.
Finally, lack of a uniform system fosters litigation among the states
and between taxpayers and the states. Such litigation could be sharply
reduced if all states subscribed to the same plan. All of these problems
are resolved by a uniform act such as the MTC.
Mechanically, the MTC allocates income through the use of the
"three-factor formula". Basically, the formula allocates income among
the states based upon the weighted average of the payroll, sales, and
property located within the given state in relation to that located in all
other states. If all states followed the MTC, all of a taxpayer's income
would be allocated to some state, but a maximum of 100% would be
subject to taxation by the various states. It is important to remember,
however, that the MTC only allocates income among the states; each
state is free to tax that income as it chooses.
41 If the taxpayer operates in three states, A, B, and C, and each uses a different method
of allocation, theoretically, there is nothing to protect the taxpayer from having to pay
taxes on more than 100% of its income. Under A's method 60% of the taxpayer's income
could be allocated to that state, B-30% and C-20%. A total of ll0% of the taxpayer's in-
come would be subject to taxation. This is clearly unfair to the taxpayer and yet it can
easily happen when states use inconsistent allocation methods and all seek to maximize
their revenues. Conversely, the states may inadvertently choose methods taxing less than
100 of a taxpayer's total income, thus depriving themselves of revenue which they right-
fully deserve.
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The MTC property factor is based upon property valued at original
cost.48 While depreciated value could have been used as the basis, the
selection of original cost avoids the problem of evaluating widely varying
methods of depreciation among companies as well as dealing with such
nebulous concepts as replacement cost and fair market value. Though
in certain circumstances original cost can result in unusually high or
low allocations to a particular state,49 the practical problems of the
other bases seem to far outweigh the theoretical problems encountered
with the cost basis.
The cost of property within a state is determined by averaging the
value of the property at the beginning and end of the tax year.5 0  While
this method is relatively easy for the Commissioner to administer, valua-
tion at only two dates per year opens the door to abuses by certain in-
dustries.5 1 It would seem that an average taken on a monthly basis
would be almost as easy to administer and yet would effectively curb5 1
such abuses. 53
The property factor also takes into account property rented or leased
by the taxpayer. Such property enters into the computation by valuation
at eight times the annual rental cost, less any sub-rental income.5 4
This provision recognizes the fact that leasing is a common method of
financing business activities and that long-term leasing is, in effect, a
purchase of the leased equipment.55 The inclusion of rental property is
8 P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNrr 1 6325 (1975).
9 For example, a large plant constructed in state A in 1960 might have originally cost
$1,000,000. The same plant constructed in state B in 1976 might cost $1,500,000, due
to inflation. This company's property factor would allocate more income to state B even
though the plants are identical, except for their age and cost. The problem could be
avoided if replacement cost were used as a basis for the property factor. This would
presumably set the value of the plant in A at $1,500,000 (the cost to replace it in 1976).
As a practical matter, replacement cost is difficult to determine and necessarily involves a
subjective evaluation. Further, it only changes the allocation among the states, not in
total. Nevertheless, cost basis allocation in periods of rising prices does allocate a larger
portion of income to states which, on the whole, have newer, more expensive plants and
equipment. This favors those states with newer, developing industries rather than those
with older, more stable industries. It results in an anomaly in that those states that are
already expanding are allocated more income than those that have reached a more mature
stage in their growth cycle.
50 UDITPA § 12.
51 Companies with very expensive, mobile equipment would be motivated to move the
equipment out of the state for the dates of determination. For instance, a construction com-
pany near the Michigan border could move a number of its cranes, trucks, and tractors
across the border into Indiana from December 29 to January 2 of each year. If Indiana
does not use a property factor or if it taxes at a lower rate, such an annual trek could prove
quite fruitful.
12 While the type of movement described in the previous footnote may be feasible once
a year, this method would require monthly movement. The cost and inconvenience of
such movement would seem to outweigh any tax benefits that might be derived.
-3 While the Commissioner has the power to use a method other than annual averages,
e.g. UDITPA § 12, he would not invoke the power unless he had reason to believe the
annual method was inaccurate or fraudulent. If he had such knowledge, it would seem
he could show the movement to be a sham to avoid taxes, and ignore it anyway.
" P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAxEs, ALL STATES UNrr 6325 (1975).
" It is now a widely recognized theory of finance that leasing is simply a form of




in accord with the substance of the lease transaction, rather than its
form. Thus, the taxpayer that chooses to lease a large portion of its
equipment is not taxed any less than the one that chooses to purchase
its equipment. The derivation of the eight times annual rental cost is
unclear, but appears reasonable in relationto prevailing interest rates.56
C. The Determination of "Taxable Income"
Having elected to rely on an income tax rather than some other
form of business taxation, a legislature must decide upon a definition
of "taxable income". Through its determination of what is to be included
in income, the legislature gives effect to its tax policies. If there are
certain types of income, certain transactions or businesses that the
legislature wishes to promote, it will frequently do so by excluding such
income from the definition of that which is taxable. It is this definition
that determines the true shape of the tax and reflects the policies of
the legislature.
Rather than develop a comprehensive statutory definition of taxable
income, most states adopt the definition used for federal tax purposes,
beginning the computation with the taxpayer's income figure from its
federal tax return, then making adjustments to arrive at the state's defi-
nition of taxable income. The advantages of "piggybacking" the Internal
Revenue Code in this way are severalfold.5 7  First, it is legislatively
economical. It is far easier to embrace the time-tested federal defini-
tion of income and the body of law that surrounds it5 than to develop
a new definition. Second, future disputes about the meaning of the
statute that are resolved at the federal level are, by implication, re-
See, e.g., R. JoHNSoN, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 422 (4th ed. 1971). See also Gant, Illusion
in Lease Financing, 37 HAnV. Bus. REV. 121 (Mar-Apr. 1959); Howard, The Essential
Elements of a Net Lease, 8 PRAC. LAW. 15, 28-29 (Feb. 1962); Williams, The Role of the
Commercial Lease in Corporate Finance, 22 Bus. LAW. 751 (1967).
Because of the widespread use of lease financing, the Securities Exchange Commission
now requires disclosure of the effect of certain types of leases on the financial statements
of regulated companies. 5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,169 (1974).
Recognizing that leasing is a method of obtaining the use of an asset, the property
factor would be inaccurate if it did not recognize the leased (or rented) assets as income-
producing assets of the enterprise. It does so by bringing leased property into the compu-
tation at eight times annual rental.
56 The rate of eight times annual rental implies that the cost of the leased equipment
was eight times what the lessor charges for it annually. This implies a gross annual return
to the lessor of 12.5% (1--8) of the cost of the asset. Such a return appears reasonable in
relation to the prevailing prime interest rates, note 219 infra. A more detailed discussion
of the relationship between leasing charges and interest rates is Pettway, Interest Rates on
Direct Leases and Secured Term Loans, 3 NAT'L BANK. REV. 533 (1966).
" The discussion of the benefits of "piggybacking" is drawn from Cheney, The Michi-
gan Income Tax Act, 47 MicH. ST. B.J. 29, 31-32 (Feb. 1968), which discussed the same
issues with regard to Michigan's personal income tax.
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.2(2) (Supp. 1976) reads in part: "A reference in this
act to the internal revenue code inclues other provisions of the laws of the United States
relating to federal income taxes." This provision is apparently an attempt to embrace
more than the statutory language of the Internal Revenue Code. Its reference to "laws"
certainly would include court decisions and, arguably, could be expanded to include
Treasury Department regulations and Internal Revenue Service rulings. Inclusion of
such "law" is desirable since it is necessary to properly interpret the Code. However,
a more specific provision would have clarified the Michigan legislature's intent.
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solved at the state level as well. This avoids wasteful litigation of
similar issues and provides guidance on questions that otherwise might
not have been raised at the state level. Third, it enables the taxpayer
to plan its tax activities at the federal and state levels simultaneously.
If the taxpayer secures a federal revenue ruling on the treatment of a
particular income transaction or item, that ruling should, in most cases,
apply to the state level as well. Although federal rulings are not bind-
ing upon a state, unless the state has a strong contrary interest, it would
appear that most properly determined federal rulings would lead the
state tax commissioner to a similar finding for the taxpayer. The one
danger in piggybacking the federal tax is that the legislature might un-
intentionally adopt federal tax policies that it would not have adopted
had it directly considered the issues.
D. "Persons" Subject to Taxation
All but two states impose some form of direct taxation on corpora-
tions;59 taxes on the income of estates and trusts are also common.
6 0
Despite the pervasiveness of taxes, there is one entity that has fairly suc-
cessfully avoided direct income taxation - the partnership. 61 The fed-
eral income tax does not reach the partnership as an entity, except in
unusual circumstances, 62 because generally, a partnership is viewed as
the aggregate of the individual partners and not as a separate, taxable
entity.6 The income generated by the partnership flows through to the
partners as individuals, and is taxed at the individual level rather than
at the entity level. For the most part states have followed federal prec-
edent and not taxed the partnership as an entity separate from its part-
ners. There is no legal reason why states cannot tax partnerships di-
rectly. Apparently, the primary reason they have not done so is to
conform with the taxing scheme of other states and the federal govern-
ment. There is no theoretical problem with directly taxing partnerships
according to the entity theory, under which the partnership is viewed as
an entity separate from its partners. 64 The practical advantage of tax-
ing partnerships directly is that they represent a significant, very lucra-
5 Only Nevada and South Dakota are without some direct corporate tax. See P-H
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 101 (1975).
60 Id. 200, 91,188, 91,560 (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 208.3(2), 208.6(1),
208.31(1) (Supp. 1976); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 641-69.
6 Included in this discussion are those entities "taxed" like the partnership. Generally,
this includes limited partnerships, joint ventures, and similar unincorporated associations.
62 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 701. If the partnership is structured such that it has more
corporate characteristics than partnership characteristics, the federal government may
impose the corporate tax on the partnership despite the partnership's legal status. See
Treas. Beg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -2 (1965); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3 to -4 (1960).
63 See J. CtONMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 161, 162 (2d ed.
1973). For certain transactions, the Internal Revenue Code does adopt the entity approach.
Id.; See also J. PENNELL & J. O'BYRNE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND PARTNER-
ssIS 2-3 (1970).
64 Even the federal income tax adopts an amalgamation of the entity and aggregate




tive source of revenue.6 5 Recognizing this advantage, three states do
tax partnerships"6 and, with the passage of the SBTA, Michigan became
the fourth.6 7
There is one problem posed by corporate taxpayers that is not pres-
ent when dealing with partnerships. As entities separate from their
shareholders, corporations can, and often do, earn large amounts of
money that are not distributed to the shareholders. Distribution is in-
dependent of earnings. Thus, if there were no tax on corporate earnings
when earned, only when distributed, it could be many years before the
state would be able to tax the corporation's earnings. The federal gov-
ernment and the states have resolved this problem by imposing a tax on
corporate earnings when earned.6 Thus, even if the income is retained
in the corporation, it does not escape or delay taxation. When it is distrib-
uted it is taxed again by taxing the shareholders. The problem that
arises when a corporation retains earnings to avoid the tax levied on its
shareholders upon distribution is resolved for partnerships by not recog-
nizing it as a separate taxable entity and taxing its earnings regardless
of when they are distributed. Under the federal scheme and that of all
but four states, partnerships are taxed according to the aggregate the-
ory .6 The income is considered to be earned by the partners in their
individual capacity, rather than by a separate entity. The partner is
taxed on his distributive share of the partnership's profits regardless of
whether the income is actually distributed.7 0  Therefore, even though
partnership income may be retained at the partnership level, it is taxed
to the partners as earned.
Perhaps the major reason for imposing an income tax on the partner-
ship as an entity is that it offers a source of additional revenue.
71 It
must be remembered, however, that if a tax is imposed on the entity's
net income, the amount distributed to each partner is thereby reduced
and, as a consequence, their personal income tax will be reduced. In
other words, a gain in tax revenue as a result of the new tax on the en-
tity will be offset by a reduction in the revenue from the personal in-
65 In 1971 there were 959,000 partnerships operating in the United States. They
generated net profits of $9,000,000,000. In 1970 there were 35,000 partnerships operat-
ing in Michigan (36,000 in Ohio) that generated gross receipts of $2,914,000,000
($3,022,000,000 in Ohio). U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 476-77 (1974).
66 See P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 101 (1975). D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 47-1574 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 77:3 II, 77:14- :16 (1970); Id. 77-A:1
I, III (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 701-23 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
For a discussion of the New York tax, see Murphy, The Unincorporated Business Tax, 29
N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N BuLL. 359 (1957).
17 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 208.31(1), .6(1), .3(2) (Supp. 1976). The tax reaches
only the income generated by "business activities" as defined in the SBTA.
68 Another safeguard is the direct tax on excess accumulated earnings. See INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531-37. While the prospect of this tax motivates businesses to
distribute excess earnings, the tax has no effect on earnings retained for the business'
use.
6 See note 63 supra.
10 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 701.
71 See note 65 supra.
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come tax. This effect may make the new entity tax less appealing than
it would appear on its face. For example, assume that a partnership
has a net income for 19X1 of $100,000 to be distributed to its equal part-
ners, A and B, both of whom are in a 10% personal income tax bracket.
If the partnership is not taxed as an entity, the personal income tax gen-
erates revenue from the profits of the entity of $10,000 (10% of A's
$50,000 income from the partnership plus 10% of B's $50,000 income).
When a 10% tax is imposed on the partnership directly, it will pay a
$10,000 tax (10% of its $100,000 income) then only $90,000 is available
to be taxed by the personal income tax, which would generate revenue
of only $9,000. So, although the state has increased its revenue by
$10,000 as a result of the partnership tax, it lost $1,000 of personal in-
come tax revenue for a net gain of $9,000.72 In other words, the in-
crease in revenue generated by a tax on partnerships as entities would
not be as great as one might expect from multiplying the partnership
tax rate times the net income of all partnerships operating within a
given state.
II. THE MICHIGAN SINGLE BusINEss TAX Acr
A. The Type of Tax Adopted
As early as 1921, Michigan imposed franchise taxes7 3 on corpora-
tions doing business within the state. By the 1950's, in the face of seri-
ous deficits, 74 the legislature sought to raise additional revenue and im-
posed the Business Activities Tax75 on corporations. At that time an in-
come tax was considered, but due to strong opposition, 76 and in light of
the Michigan Constitution's prohibition against graduated taxes,77 the
72 Whether there is any net gain to the state from the imposition of such a tax depends
on the relative tax rates. In most cases, there will be a net revenue increase. The excep-
tion arises when the personal tax rate far exceeds (perhaps 5 to 6 times) the rate sought
to be imposed on the partnership.
73 Mich. Pub. Acts of 1921, No. 85. The nature of franchise taxes is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 19-27 supra.
71 See Brazer, Michigan's Fiscal Outlook, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 430, 431 (1965).
75 Mich. Pub. Acts of 1953, No. 150 (codified in MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 205.551-
.574 (1967)).
76 Brazer, Michigan's Fiscal Outlook, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 430, 436 (1965). An example
of such opposition is Ward, A C.P.A. Examines Michigan's Tax Structures, 34 MICH.
ST. B.J. 34 (Jan. 1955).
77 Some mention should be made of the tortured judicial history of Michigan income
taxes. The problem centered around a provision in the Michigan constitution that "[n]o
income tax graduated as to rate or base shall be imposed by the state or any of its sub-
divisions." MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 7.
The provision was the subject of several opinions by the Michigan Attorney General.
The opinions and the provision are briefly discussed in Glavin, Constitutional Law, 1965
Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 84, 103 (1965); Nord, The Michigan
Constitution of 1963, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 309, 360 (1964); Quick, Constitutional Law, 1962
Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 40, 57-58 (1962).
There was little litigation of the provision until a taxpayer challenged the Income Tax
Act of 1967, Micn. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 206 (Supp. 1976), on the grounds that credits
granted for property and city income taxes paid pursuant to id. §§ 206.257-.258 indirectly





Act took the form of a value-added tax. 71 In 1967 the Business Activ-
ities Tax was repealed79 in favor of the Income Tax Act of 1967 that
reached individuals and estates as well as corporations."' Although the
1967 income tax is still in effect as to individuals, estates, and trusts,
the SBTA is now the primary tax on business activities;8' thus, the
name "Single" Business Tax.
As is apparent, Michigan has experimented with a wide variety of
methods for the taxation of business. 82 Because of this, prior to the
enactment of the SBTA businesses were faced with a patchwork system
of taxation which seemed to lack a common purpose or direction.
8 3
The SBTA, however, represents an effort to enact a comprehensive plan
[w]hat the people sought to prohibit was the imposition of the kind of graduated
income tax imposed by the Federal government. Of course, the legislature may
not accomplish by indirection that which it may not do directly ...
The words "or base" in the phrase "no income tax graduated as to rate or base
shall be imposed" prohibit only the imposition of a so-called "piggyback" income
tax, i.e., one based on a taxpayer's Federal tax liability.
The credits for property and income taxes are allowed against the tax liability
of all taxpayers without regard to their income. The limitations upon the amounts
of credits that may be claimed by a taxpayer are not based upon the taxpayer's
income; the effect is not to impose a tax violative of the [constitution] ...
Kuhn v. Department of Treasury, 15 Mich. App. 364, 370-71, 166 N.W.2d 697, 700-01
(1968) (footnotes omitted), modified, 384 Mich. 378, 183 N.W.2d 796 (1971).
The SBTA exempts the first $34,000 for the 1976 tax year and $36,000 for 1977 and
every year thereafter from taxation. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 208.35(a) (Supp. 1976).
A flat rate of tax of 2.35% is imposed on income in excess of the amount exempted. Id. §
208.31(1).
Though the SBTA is based on federal taxable income, it is not based on federal tax
liability. Thus, it is not the type of "piggyback" tax proscribed by the Kuhns court.
One challenging the SBTA could distinguish the tax credits approved by the Kuhns court
on the grounds that those credits were not based on income, whereas the SBTA exemption
is. Challengers would assert that the SBTA is "graduated" to the extent that it provides
for no tax up to $36,000 and 2.35% above that. However, this position would appear to
be weak when compared with the federal tax which has rates gradually increasing from
14% to 70% with income. It seems doubtful that the Michigan courts would find the
SBTA "graduated" in view of the definitions in the first two paragraphs quoted above
and the structure of the SBTA as compared with the federal tax.
7' Barnes, The Business Receipts Tax, 32 MICH. ST. B.J. 31 (Oct. 1953), introduces
the concept of a value-added tax and critically examines it.
71 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 205.551-.574 (Supp. 1976).
85 Id. § 206. The tax applies to individuals, estates, trusts, and corporations. An over-
view of the tax is provided by Cheney, The Michigan Income Tax Act, 47 MICH. ST. B.J. 29
(Feb. 1968).
51 The 1967 income tax was repealed for corporations. Mich. Pub. Acts of 1975,
No. 233 (codified in scattered portions of MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 206 (Supp. 1976)).
Individuals, estates, and trusts that remain subject to the tax are allowed a credit against
it for a percentage of the SBTA tax paid. MICH. COMp. LAwS ANN. § 206.269 (Supp.
1976). See note 87 infra.
12 In addition to those discussed, Michigan has also used tangible and intangible
property taxes.
83 Brazer, Michigan's Fiscal Outlook, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 430, 434-50 (1965) discusses
the development of the various taxes and gives some indication of the overall coin-
plexity. Brazer concluded that comprehensive tax reform is necessary. Id. at 450. More
recently, the need for a comprehensive reform of business taxes in Michigan wvas ex-
pressed in, Stanley, Tunstall & Opper, State and Local Taxation, 1974 Annual Survey of
Michigan Law, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 619 (1975).
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for the taxation of business and, additionally, to reduce the complexity
of the state's taxes.8 4
As a result of the adoption of the income-based SBTA, Michigan
businesses will enjoy the benefits of an income tax rather than some
other form of taxation. The primary advantage of the income tax, as
developed earlier in this note,85 is its equality for the taxpayer. It
taxes on the basis of the taxpayer's ability to pay and thus, it is the
fairest form of taxation. Apparently, the Michigan legislature found
that the advantages of the income tax outweighed those of the other
taxes it could have imposed. 86  Even the time-honored property tax was
reduced to a relatively minor role in the overall scheme.8 7
B. Michigan's Multistate Income Allocation
1. The Michigan Statute
Though it did not adopt the uniform act,88 Michigan is a member of
the Multistate Tax Compact.8 9 Despite that membership, the SBTA
varies from the MTC in several respects worthy of discussion.
For those taxpayers engaging in business activities taxable both in
Michigan and in other states, the SBTA complies with the MTC 90 and
requires allocation based upon sales, property, and payroll. Likewise,
the Michigan definition of "taxable within another state" complies with
the MTC.9' Unlike the MTC, however, the SBTA also provides that,
[i]n the case of a taxpayer whose business activities are con-
fined solely to this state, the entire tax base of the taxpayer shall
be allocated to this state .... 92
s Numerous other taxes on businesses were repealed with the passage of the SBTA.
See note 2 supra.
" See notes 28-37 supra and accompanying text.
s6 Michigan and Ohio legislative history is almost non-existant. Ohio history consists
only of notation of the action on bills in the legislative journal. The history of the Ohio
Income Tax is illustrative. 134 OHIO SENATE J. 2332-33 (1971-72) (the pages referred to
therein). Michigan's history consists only of notations of when the various committees
met and, very generally, what they discussed. Letter from the Director, Legislative Ser-
vice Bureau, Lansing, Michigan, June 3, 1976, on file in the offices of the Cleveland State
Law Review. Thus, legislative intent in both states is left to speculation and reports in
the press.
" Note 2 supra, shows the bills passed along with the SBTA. Intangibles, inventories,
materials, and supplies were all exempted from the general property tax, apparently leav-
ing only capital assets subject to it.
It should be noted that the SBTA itself refers to the nature of the SBTA as a tax on
the privilege of doing business, not a tax on income. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.31(4)
(Supp. 1976). Although this type of statement is contained in most state income tax laws
to avoid constitutional problems, it is not binding on a court. The court will look to the
true nature of the tax, rather than the legislature's characterization of it. P-H STATE AND
LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 91,105 (1962) (and footnotes).
8 See UDITPA, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 258 (Supp. 1976).
'9 P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 5150 (1976).
9o Compare MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 208.41 (Supp. 1976) with P-H STATE AND
LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6316 (1975).
91 Compare MICH. COMe. LAWS ANN. § 208.42 (Supp. 1976) with P-H STATE AND
LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6317 (1975).




As noted above, the MTC allocates based on sales, property, and
payroll within a given state in relation to other states. That definition
notwithstanding, it does seem reasonable that if all of a business's ac-
tivities are within Michigan, all of its income should be allocated to
Michigan. A conflict becomes apparent, however, when the definition
of "business activities" is consulted. The SBTA provides,
"[b]usiness activity" means a transfer of legal or equitable title
to or rental of property . . . or the performance of services
... made or engaged in . . . within this state, whether in
intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce .... 93
In other words the SBTA equates "business activity" with sales.
Apparently, this definition is an attempt by the legislature to avoid
some of the constitutional attacks on past statutes.9 4 All of a business's
income is allocated to Michigan if all of its sales (or services or rentals)
are within Michigan, regardless of the interstate/intrastate quality of
those sales.
The first problem with this is that neither the MTC nor the uniform
act make such a provision,95 so, presumably, none of the states which
follow those acts have either. Michigan has, thereby, thwarted one of
the stated purposes of the MTC - to promote uniformity among the
member states.96
Closer analysis reveals another reason for the deviation - a larger
income allocation for Michigan. The MTC allocates based upon the loca-
tion of sales, property, and payroll.9 7 The fact that all sales might be
within a state is of no consequence to the MTC; all three factors must
be considered. With these two statutory provisions,9 8 Michigan allo-
cates all of a business's income to the state if all of its business activities
(sales or services) are rendered within the state. This ignores the pos-
sibility that the company might have property or payroll in other states
and, under the MTC, would be required to allocate a portion of its in-
come to those other states. So, although it has ostensibly complied
with the MTC, Michigan has been unable to resist the temptation to
maximize its revenues at the expense of fairness to the individual tax-
payer.99
93 Id. § 208.3(2).
" There were numerous early cases attacking state taxes on transactions in interstate
commerce. See note 5 supra.
15 See P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6315-32 (1975); UDITPA
991-10.
96 P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6310(2) (1975).
17 These concepts are more fully developed in notes 44-56 supra and accompanying
text.
s MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 208.3(2), .40 (Supp. 1976).
9 The burden of this section falls especially heavily on companies that manufacture a
product in another state, but sell solely within Michigan. They would be required to allo-
cate 100% of their income to Michigan since all sales are within the state. Yet, if the state
in which their plant is located follows the MTC, they would be required to allocate income
to that state under the payroll and property factors. Once again, the individual taxpayer
would be taxed on more than 100% of its income.
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\Vith the exception of the variations just discussed, the SBTA formula
substantially complies with the MTC.'0 Simply stated, income is ap-
portioned to Michigan by applying a percentage to the taxpayer's total
income. That percentage is the weighted average of: (1) all sales within
Michigan to total sales everywhere, (2) all property within Michigan to
total property everywhere, and (3) all wages paid within Michigan to total
wages everywhere. This is commonly referred to as the three-factor
formula. According to the formula, the larger the proportion of sales,
property, and payroll a given taxpayer has within Michigan, the larger
the percentage of that taxpayer's income that is allocated to the State
of Michigan. The portion not allocated to Michigan is allocated to other
states in proportion to the sales, property, and payroll within those
states, assuming they follow the MTC. Like the MTC, the SBTA pro-
vides that if the statutory allocation results in an inequitable allocation,
the taxpayer may petition for, or the Commissioner may require, the
use of one of several other specified methods.' 0'
2. Michigan's Additions to the MTC
Even though Michigan follows the MTC's three-factor formula fairly
closely, it goes beyond it in using the state's own formula to allocate
the income of certain industries. Since the MTC does not differentiate
these industries, it allocates their income according to the three-factor
formula. The SBTA provides that those businesses transporting people
or freight shall allocate to Michigan based upon the proportion of Michi-
gan "revenue-miles" to total revenue-miles. 02  Likewise, pipeline oil is
based upon barrel-miles;' °3 natural gas by cubic feet-miles; 10 4 and insurers
according to gross premiums received on risks within Michigan in rela-
tion to total gross premiums.10 5 Financial organizations allocate based
upon the relation of Michigan gross business income to the total of such
income.°0
6
All of these provisions are at variance with the MTC. 07 Again, they
represent an effort by the Michigan legislature to maximize its revenues
at the expense of the taxpayer and in conflict with the MTC. Under
the three-factor formula, it is conceivable that little or no income from
these industries would be allocated to Michigan. If they only transport
through the state, they would have no sales or payroll within the state
and little or no property. The provisions Michigan has adopted assure
01 Compare MICH. Coip. LAws ANN. §§ 208.45-53 (Supp. 1976) with P-tl STATE AND
LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6323-31 (1975).
"o) MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 208.69 (Supp. 1976); P-H STATE AND LoCA' TAXES,
ALL STATES UNIT 6332 (1975).
10' NIICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 208.57 (Supp. 1976).
I- Id. § 208.58(1).
104 Id. § 208.58(2).
105 Id. § 208.62.
106 Id. § 208.65.
0 See P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6323-32 (1975). The Uni-




that by virtue of the fact that they must pass through the state, some
income will be allocated to it.1 °8
Michigan has also gone beyond the MTC in providing relief for small
business taxpayers. If the taxpayer does not own or rent any property
within the state and has Michigan sales of less than $100,000 during
the year, the taxpayer can elect to allocate based on the sales factor
alone. 10 9 The MTC makes no such provision.1 10 Despite the laudable
motives behind the provision, it is of questionable value. The only
types of taxpayers that would sell in Michigan without owning or rent-
ing property there (thus precluding even a sales office) would appear to
be mail order sellers, travelling salesmen who occasionally sell within
the state, and others with the most minimal contact.1 1' The statute,
however, does not significantly reduce the amount of effort required in
order to compute the tax since the sales factor and the property factor
must still be computed. Thus, the payroll computation is the only one
eliminated by this provision. Since the practical savings to the taxpayer
appear largely illusory, it would have been better not to have made such
a provision thereby staying in compliance with the MTC.
3. Michigan's Deletion of Non-Business Income
To this point, comparison of the SBTA with the MTC has been of
those SBTA sections which varied from or added to the MTC. There is,
however, one section of the MTC which the SBTA completely excludes
- non-business income. 112
The MTC allocates business income in proportion to the factors that
produce that income: sales, property, and payroll. It appears to be a
reasonable assumption that business income is generated by each of
these factors and, therefore, should be allocated based upon them.
In addition to this theoretical basis, the factors provide a relatively
practical method of allocation.
Unfortunately, the assumptions break down when dealing with non-
'0 The trucking industry is illustrative. If a certain company had routes through Mich-
igan, but never located an office there, it would allocate no income to Michigan. It had
no sales, property, or payroll within the state. Under the "revenue-miles" formula,
however, some income would be allocated to the state since it clearly had such miles within
the state, even if it had no property, sales, or payroll there. Note that the example is
complicated if payroll can be found to be within Michigan under the statutory definition
of payroll. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 208.50 (Supp. 1976).
I- Id. § 208.68(1). The SBTA also provides that the election is not available for
those filing a consolidated return, id. § 208.68(2), reinforcing the idea that it is directed
toward the smaller taxpayer that would probably not have multiple, affiliated corporations.
110 See P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNrr 6323-32 (1975).
I Taxpayers whose only contact with the state is the solicitation of orders, could seek
protection under 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1970), which prohibits the levying of state income
taxes on such taxpayers. The SBTA does not codify this provision. See P-H STATE AND
LOCAL TAXES, SPECIAL MICHIGAN REPORT 115 (1975).
112 This section of the discussion makes direct comparisons to the MTC; however,
since the MTC sections were drawn from the Uniform Act, citation to both will be provided.
113 Non-business income is all income other than business income. P-H STATE AND
LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNrr 6315.25 (1975); UDITPA § 1(e).
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business income. 113 This is income generated outside the scope of nor-
mal operations. It is of a passive nature, more akin to investment in-
come than "business" income. It may have no relation to the three
factors of production normally used to allocate income. For example,
a manufacturing company with a plant presently unused may rent the
plant to another company until such time as the owning company needs
the plant. This rental income may be quite significant. It is clear that
the rental income is. generated by the property alone, having no rela-
tion to payroll or sales within that state. Thus, the rental income should
be allocated fully to the state where the plant is located if the allocation
is to reflect the economic reality of the situation. Thus, this is one case
in which the three-factor formula should be dropped in favor of full al-
location to the state where the property is located.
Recognizing this problem, the MTC provides that
[r]ents and royalties from real or tangible personal property,
capital gains, interest, dividends, or patent or copyright royal-
ties, to the extent that they constitute non-business income,
shall be allocated [specially] .114
The non-business income generated by patent and copyright royal-
ties, and the capital gains related thereto, are allocated on a "situs"
theory. Basically, the income is allocated to the state wherein the prop-
erty is located, consistent with the example discussed above." 5 Inter-
est and dividend income is allocated to the state wherein the taxpayer's
commercial domicile is located." 6 The theory here is apparently that
investment activities are conducted by the head office, principally for its
benefit, and the income generated should be taxed to that office. Allo-
cation of interest and dividends on a "situs" basis would be difficult, if
not impossible.
By choosing not to adopt the MTC non-business income provision
quoted above, Michigan has implicitly elected to allocate that income
by the same method used to allocate business income - the three-factor
formula. The precise impact of this choice is difficult to calculate."
7
One positive consequence, however, is that it saves taxpayers from hav-
"Business income" means income arising from transactions and activity in the
regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and includes income from tangi-
ble and intangible property if the acquisition, management and disposition of
the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business
operations.
P-H STATE AND LocAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNrr 6315.5 (1975); UDITPA § l(a).
114 P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6318 (1975); IJDITPA § 4.
"s See P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 11 6319, 6320, 6322 (1975);
UDITPA §§ 5, 6, 8.
"o P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6321 (1975); UDITPA § 7.
"Commercial domicile" means the principal place from which the trade or busi-
ness of the taxpayer is directed or managed.
P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6351.10 (1975); UDITPA § 1(b).
117 One would have to calculate the revenues generated from non-business income un-
der the three-factor formula versus the MTC plan described in this section. This would
require information on the relative number of commercial domiciles and non-business, in-




ing to calculate the non-business income allocation separately. It is
included as a part of the three-factor formula calculation."' One nega-
tive aspect though, is that once again, Michigan has deviated from the
MTC, the purpose of which was to create a uniform allocation system.
In summary then, it has been shown that although Michigan has
nominally adopted the MTC, it has deviated from it in the areas of
"business activities," certain special industries, small taxpayers, and
non-business income.
C. The Determination of "Taxable Income"
There are approximately twenty adjustments to federal taxable in-
come to arrive at SBTA taxable income. 119 Many are of a minor nature
and need not be discussed; however, some significantly differ from what
might be expected and merit special attention.
Federal gross income excludes interest received from securities issued
by state governments and their subdivisions. 12 0 In order to subject
that income to taxation, Michigan adds the interest so excluded back into
income for SBTA purposes. 2 However, only the income from securities
of states'2 2 other than Michigan is added back. Apparently to protect
and promote investment in Michigan securities, the income from them is
not taxed.'l 3
Another adjustment made to federal taxable income for SBTA pur-
poses is that of disallowing the federal net operating loss deduction.
124
"1 The Multistate Tax Commission might consider whether the benefits of the alloca-
tion used by this section, as opposed to the three-factor method, outweigh the "cost" of
the additional computations. The cost seems particularly high in view of the fact that it
involves non-business income, by definition, a relatively small part of total income. It
would seem that some distortion of economic reality is acceptable for such a small per-
centage of total income.
'9 A graphic illustration of the basic adjustments is found in 1 CCH Mich. Tax Rep.
1711 (1975).
2l INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103(a)(1). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1 (1972).
12l MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.9(2) (Supp. 1976). Certain expenses related to this
type of income are disallowed at the federal level under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 265.
They are not deductible because, since the income they generate is not taxed, the ex-
penses incurred in generating it should not be deductible. To the extent these expenses
are excluded at the federal level, they may be deducted for Michigan purposes. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.9(2) (Supp. 1976). This is appropriate since, if the income is to
be taxed, the expenses incurred in generating it should be deductible. Apparently, the
expenses can be deducted even if they exceed the income generated. This is also proper
since it is an investment loss like any other.
122 "State" is defined to include political subdivisions thereof. MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 208.7(2) (Supp. 1976).
123 Only that interest incidental to business income is added back. The fact that a part-
ner holds bonds which are federally tax-exempt does not necessarily imply that he should
add back the income for SBTA purposes. Only if the income generated by the bonds is
"business income" would he add it back. If the income is generated from the investment
of his personal funds, it would not be business income. See id. § 208.3(2), (3); P-H STATE
AND LOCAL TAXES, SPECIAL MICHIGAN REPORT 155 (1975).
124 Any carryback or carryforward of such losses is added back to the extent deducted
for federal purposes. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.9(4)(a) (Supp. 1976).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172 provides the operating loss deduction at the federal
level. Its practical aspects are explored in a series of articles in Utilization of Net Operat-
ing Loss Deductions, 14 W. REs. L. REV. 233-305 (1963).
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Instead, the SBTA substitutes its own version of the operating loss de-
duction. After the allocation of all multistate income1 25 and certain
other items,12 6 any unused business loss from prior years is deducted
27
until the present year's taxable income is reduced to zero. Remaining
losses from prior years and any additional losses generated in the current
year 28 may then be carried forward to offset up to ten future years'
taxable income. The losses may not be carried back to prior years.
129
This differs from the federal approach which allows the loss to be carried
back three years and forward five.13 0  While the Michigan approach
may superficially appear more generous, allowing a total of ten years
for which the loss can be carried, as opposed to the federal tax's eight
(back three, forward five), the lack of a carryback provision is signifi-
cant.
Carryback provisions are highly beneficial in a loss year because that
loss can be carried back to offset prior profitable years' income. This
reduces the tax liability for those earlier years and results in an immediate
refund of the tax paid in those years.' 3 ' The refund comes at the time
when the business needs it most - early in the year following the loss year.
On the other hand, the only solace Michigan provides for the business
taxpayer that has suffered a loss year is that future years' taxes will be
reduced. While this is probably sufficient for taxpayers suffering losses
for one or two years,'132 for taxpayers with losses over a three to five
year period, an immediate refund would be more beneficial than a pos-
sible tax reduction five years hence, 33 when the business becomes
profitable again. In fact, without the refund, there is an increased chance
the company may not survive long enough to reap the benefits of the loss
carryforward. 134
125 Allocation of multistate income is discussed in notes 44-56 supra and accompany-
ing text. While that allocation also affects Michigan taxable income, it will be discussed
separately.
121 MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 208.23(a)-(d) (Supp. 1976).
127 Id. § 208.23(e). Unused losses from the now repealed corporation income tax may
also be deducted until they expire on December 31, 1980. Id. § 208.23(f).
125 The loss is not deductible in the loss year but may only be carried forward to offset
future years' income. Id. § 208.23(e).
129 Id.
130 Ir. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 172(b)(1)(A)(i), (B).
131 Losses still unused after the reduction of all three prior years' income to zero, are
then carried forward. If losses were incurred in all three prior years, only carryforward
is available. The carryback/carryforward is applied in chronological order, beginning with
earliest eligible year. Id. § 172(b)(2).
132 For instance, if the taxpayer suffers a loss in one year, but recovers in the next, the
benefit of the carryforward will begin to be realized when the next SBTA estimated tax
payment is made. The payment will be reduced by the proportionate amount of the
carryforwvard. Of course, if there were only losses in the prior years, there would be no
profitable years to which the loss could be carried, thus only carryforward would be avail-
able.
133 Unlike the taxpayers described in note 132 supra, those with losses over a longer
period are making no estimated tax payments anyway, because they anticipate no tax lia-
bility for the coming year. Not until they return to a profitable situation will they be able
to utilize the carryforward.




Dotibtless, part of the reason Michigan has avoided operating loss
carrybacks is to keep the tax as simple as possible. 135 Nevertheless, even
a very basic carryback provision would provide a much-needed injection
of funds to the taxpayer that has suffered three to five years of losses.
The most unusual adjustments made in computing SBTA taxable
income are those pertaining to wages and the cost of capital assets.
The objective of the adjustments apparently is to tax labor-intensive
industries on a par with capital-intensive industries' 36 and to give the
tax some of the characteristics of a value-added tax.
137
First, all deductions for "compensation" are added back to federal
taxable income to determine SBTA income.1 38  In other words, com-
pensation is not a deductible expense for SBTA purposes. Compensa-
tion is defined to include payments for unemployment insurance, social
security, pension and profit sharing plans, and other indirect forms of
compensation, as well as salaries and wages. 3 9  This effectively denies
any deduction for any type of compensation, regardless of its form.
The denial of a deduction for compensation expenses is highly un-
usual in the field of income taxation. 40 It denies recognition to one of
the most significant expenses of operating a business. The ramifica-
tions are difficult to estimate, but it seems clear that this innovation will
have some inhibitive effect on labor-intensive industries. While certain
provisions mitigate the effects of the adjustment,' 4' it appears they offer
relief only to the most labor-intensive industries. Those more closely
tenth year. In that case, or if the taxpayer goes out of business, the carryforward benefit
has been lost forever.
13-5 Loss carrybacks are especially complicated because they require a recomputation
of a prior year's taxes as long as three years after the original computation was made.
Changes in the law since the date of the original computation present one problem.
Carryforwards, on the other hand, are usually simpler since they are taken as a reduction
of income for the year in which they are being utilized and in which the return is being
computed. Since businesses can, to some extent, control losses, the lack of a carryback
reduces the ability to take a loss in order to generate a refund. Ohio does not allow a loss
carryback either. See note 193 infra and accompanying text.
Another reason why states may choose not to adopt the carryback provision of the
federal income tax is based on the fact that they deal with a narrower tax base than the
federal government. If a state's economy is heavily dependent upon one industry, in any
year when business is bad for that industry the state treasury would be "squeezed" from
two directions. It would be receiving fewer revenues, and in addition, would be forced
to pay out refunds to businesses that had suffered a net loss.
13 P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, SPECIAL MICHIGAN REPORT 200 (1975).
137 Id. 100.
131 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.9(5) (Supp. 1976). The lack of a deduction for
compensation does help to eliminate the frequent abuse by close corporations taking all
of the profits of the corporation out as "salary" rather than paying the double tax on
dividends.
139 Id. § 208.4(3).
140 The concept of income taxation is usually based on a tax on the net income of the
business as computed for financial accounting purposes with minor adjustments. See
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(1); note 187 infra and accompanying text; P-H STATE
AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 91,307 (1962).
141 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 208.31(2), (5) (Supp. 1976). In addition, id. §§ 208.31(6),
(7) will give some relief through 1977.
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balanced between the labor and capital factors of production will not be
helped at all by these provisions. 42
While this denial of a deduction for compensation expenses is un-
usual, the adjustment for capital asset expenditures is even more novel.
Under the SBTA, the cost of tangible, depreciable assets is fully deducti-
ble in the year of purchase, and the gross proceeds from the sale of
assets are added back to income in the year of sale.143 In other words,
there is no depreciation taken under the SBTA for most assets; rather, a
full cost deduction is allowed in the year of purchase.
Rather than allowing such a full cost deduction in the year of pur-
chase, most income taxes prorate the cost of the asset over its useful
life.14 4 This is accomplished by deducting (depreciating) a portion of the
cost each year until the total cost, less salvage value, has been de-
ducted. Thus, the total cost of the asset is recognized through a series
of annual charges rather than by a full deduction in the year of purchase.
Under both systems the total amount deducted is the same, only the
timing is different. Theoretically, depreciation better matches the cost
of the asset with the economic services generated by it. 45  The allow-
ance of a full cost deduction denies the economic reality of capital asset
utilization. It assumes the full economic service value of the asset is
expended in one year - an assumption that is false for most assets.
The mechanics of the capital asset deduction are complex, but seem
internally consistent. 46  They do, however, reveal a more preferential
treatment for Michigan real estate than for realty in other states. The
SBTA provides that for all personalty, and for Michigan realty, deprecia-
tion must be added back to taxable income, thus denying a deduction
for any depreciation taken for federal tax purposes. A full cost deduction
1412 If the tax base exceeds 50% of Michigan gross receipts (either actual or allocated),
such excess can be used to reduce the tax base; or, if compensation exceeds 65% of the
tax base, such excess up to 35% of the tax base can be used to reduce that base. Id.
§§ 208.31(2), (5). The effect of these provisions is: (1) to limit the overall tax base, regard-
less of the labor adjustment, to 50% of gross receipts, thus ameliorating the tendency of the
SBTA toward a gross receipts tax in certain situations; and (2) to reduce the impact of
the labor cost adjustment when labor exceeds 65% of the tax base. Since the 65% mini-
mum must be met before relief is available, only those industries and businesses which
are highly labor-intensive would be helped by the saving provision. In addition, the tax-
payer can elect to use only one of these provisions.
143 Id. §§ 208.23(a)-(d).
141 See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
145 An excellent introduction to depreciation and the policies behind it is found in
J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 689-700 (1972).
14 The related sections are MiCH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 208.9(4)(b), (4)(c), (6), (8),
208.23(a)-(d) (Supp. 1976). The inclusion of gross proceeds in the year of sale is consis-
tent as it reflects the true cost of the asset (original price paid less proceeds of sale). In
traditional tax terms, the full deduction in the year of acquisition reduces the basis in the
asset to zero. Any proceeds at sale will be in excess of basis and will be ordinary income.
These sections eliminate for Michigan purposes all depreciation, capital gains, and
ordinary income from the sale and exchange of capital assets, that had been recognized at
the federal level. They appear to have negatived the income aspects of asset ownership
that exist at the federal level (including INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1245, 1250), allow-




is then taken for the cost of personalty and Michigan realty, less the
proceeds from any sales of such items during the year. 147  Real estate
located outside Michigan is not entitled to the full cost deduction;' 
4
however, a portion of the depreciation taken on such realty for federal
tax purposes is allowed to flow through as a deduction for Michigan
purposes. Unfortunately, the statute and the Single Business Tax Divi-
sion of the Michigan Department of Treasury do not seem to be in agree-
ment about the percentage of depreciation that is to be allowed to flow
through. The analysis of the statute is complex, but it is possible that
it contains a drafting mistake. The Single Business Tax Division has
already issued conflicting interpretations of it.' 49  Conflicts notwith-
standing, it seems clear that the intent was to allow a full cost deduction
for Michigan realty, but to allow only the depreciation of non-Michigan
realty and then to allow only a portion of the depreciation taken at the
federal level.
What, then, is the purpose of allowing a full cost deduction for capital
assets? One purpose is to favor capital-intensive industries. They re-
ceive an immediate deduction for capital expenditures rather than a
series of small deductions over a period of years. 50  The more assets
such an industry purchases, the lower its taxable income. Theoretically,
this motivates them to replace assets more quickly and such purchases
"' MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. H 208.23(a)-(d) (Supp. 1976).
'48 Id. § 208.9(4)(c) read in conjunction with Id. § 208.23(a)-(d).
149 Id. § 208.9(4) reads in part:
(4) Add, to the extent deducted in arriving at federal taxable income:
(c) Any deduction for depreciation ... pursuant to [section 208.23]...
and for the 1976 tax year, 72%, for the 1977 tax year, 50%, and for 1978 and
subsequent tax years 40% of any deduction for other depreciation ...
(emphasis added).
Section 208.23 referred to above covers the deduction for all personalty and all
Michigan realty. Thus, only non-Michigan realty is covered by the percentages in the last
two sentences quoted above. The section requires that 72% of depreciation on non-
Michigan realty be added back to income. When 72% is added back, 28% remains as a
deduction for 1976. Likewise, 50% for 1977 and 60% for 1978 and thereafter.
When it first addressed the question, the Michigan Department of Treasury asserted
that the amount of depreciation allowed was the amount quoted in the statute (72%, 50%,
40%). MICHIGAN DEPT OF TaEASURY, SINGLE BUSINESS TAX QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
vol. I, Question 8 at 2 (Sept. 15, 1975) on file in the offices of Cleveland State Law Review
(reproduced in 1 CCH Mich. Tax Rep. 19-001 (1975)). This interpretation is contrary
to the analysis above which concludes that the amount of depreciation allowed is the re-
ciprocal of the percentage quoted in the statute. Three months later, the Department
agreed with the above (reciprocal) interpretation. See Single Business Tax Division,
Michigan Dep't of Treasury, the New Single Business Tax 2, 3 (Dec. 5, 1975), on file in
the offices of Cleveland State Law Review.
It would seem to make more sense for the legislature to phase out depreciation on
non-Michigan realty (72-50-40%), rather than to adopt the reciprocal interpretation that is
suggested (28-50-60%). This would allow taxpayers time to adjust to the change, rather
than making it more difficult on them in the early years and reducing the burden in later
years. Thus, there may be a drafting mistake in MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.9(4)(c)
(Supp. 1976). At the very least, it has succeeded in confusing the Single Business Tax
Division.
150 The benefit of an immediate deduction rather than the same total deduction spread
over a series of years is determined by a concept known as the present value of money.
Basically, the theory is that it is better to have access to the money sooner. This enables
the holder to invest and earn a return on the money for that much longer.
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should stimulate the state's economy. Certainly, heavy industry should
find this provision appealing. 5 1
The elimination of depreciation accounting should simplify the tax
system. Allowing a full cost deduction avoids the many complexities
of depreciation and the problems it leads to.' 52  Unfortunately, the tax-
payer has already dealt with those problems at the federal level of tax-
ation. Thus, it would be far easier for Michigan to allow the depreciation
computed for federal purposes to flow through to Michigan, rather than
attempt to negate the federal computation and then add Michigan's
own, different method for the recognition of capital asset expenditures.
This further complicates an already troublesome area.
The add-back of wages and the full deduction of asset costs are
unusual provisions.'5 The SBTA also denies a deduction for interest
expenses. 54  Operating together, the economic impact of these adjust-
ments is difficult to evaluate. The wage and interest add-backs are
inhibitive in that they do not allow a deduction for a normal, significant
cost of operating the business, while the full cost asset deduction pro-
motes expenditures for those items. Most companies will be subject to
all of these provisions, will enjoy the benefit of the asset deduction, and
pay the penalty of the labor and interest add-backs. This makes the
economic impact of the SBTA that much more difficult to predict.
Probably the best generalization that can be made is that businesses
which have proportionately high labor and interest expenses will be
taxed more heavily, while those with a significant portion of their
property in depreciable, capital assets will be taxed very lightly.
D. "Persons" Taxed by the SBTA
Apparently attracted by the prospect of additional revenue, the Michi-
gan legislature structured the SBTA so that the tax would reach the
business activities of every type of business, regardless of its organiza-
tional structure. Corporations, partnerships, joint ventures, associations,
estates, and trusts are defined as "persons" subject to the tax. 155  The
unusual aspect of this definition is the inclusion of unincorporated enti-
151 The deduction is especially appealing to expanding capital-intensive companies.
They are purchasing considerably more equipment than they are selling and thus getting
large, full-cost deductions with little add-back for the proceeds of the sales. Conversely,
companies in a downturn, are selling more assets than they are buying and thus may be
in a position in which the proceeds of sales exceed the full cost deductions for purchases.
In short, the provision helps companies already expanding and penalizes those experi-
encing a downturn, perhaps an anomalous position.
152 An indication of one aspect of the problems of depreciation accounting is Wisniew-
ski, Parker & Jenkins, Another Look at Depreciation Reform, 4 TAX ADVISER 452, 552
(1973).
153 To a limited extent, the federal income tax allows a full-cost deduction for new
assets. A percentage (presently 10%) of the cost of the asset is deducted from the tax-
payer's liability, but not in excess of the liability. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 46-50.
See generally Rath, The Restored Investment Credit, 25 So. CAL. TAX. INST. 29 (1973).
154 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 208.9(4)(f) (Supp. 1976).




ties. Prior to the enactment of the SBTA only three other states imposed
income taxes on such entities.
5
As discussed above, 57 one of the problems in structuring a tax on
unincorporated businesses is the fact that when the tax is imposed at the
entity level, the result is a decline in the revenues generated by the per-
sonal income tax. If, however, the partnership cannot deduct the SBTA
tax paid by the partnership from the individual partner's share of the
earnings, this problem is avoided. The partnership pays an SBTA tax
on its total income and the partners pay their personal income tax without
regard for the new tax imposed on the entity. Expanding the example
from above, if a new 10% tax is imposed on a partnership with a net
income of $100,000, it generates revenue of $10,000 (10% of $100,000).
The $10,000 tax is paid by the entity and cannot be deducted from the
individual partners' share of the profits. So their "earnings" for the
year are still $100,000 which is then subjected to the personal income tax.
Since the partnership cannot deduct the SBTA tax from the individual
partners' shares, the partnership pays the full SBTA tax and the partners
the full personal income tax.
New revenue has been generated by the new tax on the unincorpo-
rated entity without a reduction in revenues derived from personal in-
come tax. This type of tax will always result in an increase in net
revenues, and it is the method that has been adopted by the SBTA.'-
While the method described is an effective revenue-raising device, it
is somewhat harsh. In the example, the partners must pay personal
income tax on $100,000 even though the partnership generated only
$90,000 ($100,000 less the $10,000 tax on the entity). In order to
mitigate this effect, the Michigan personal income tax has been modified
to allow credits against the personal income tax liability for the SBTA
tax paid by the entity. The credits range from 20% to 10% decreasing
as business income increases. It is available to individuals, partners,
and Subchapter S shareholders, but apparently not to corporate share-
156 See note 66 supra.
157 See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
' Apparently any SBTA tax paid by the partnership is not deductible in computing
the individual partner's share of income although for purposes of the personal income tax,
the statute is not clear. Taxable income, for the personal income tax, is defined as federal
adjusted gross income. MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 206.30(1) (Supp. 1976). Adjusted
gross income is gross income less trade and business expenses of those who are not em-
ployees. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 62(1). SBTA taxes paid would qualify as trade or
business expenses under id. § 162, and partners would not be considered employees.
(Employees are defined to be "employees" for federal tax purposes. MICH. COMP.
LAWs ANN. § 206.8(3) (Supp. 1976). In r. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3401(c), the definition
of employees, has been construed not to include partners. Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 CuM.
BuLL. 256). Therefore, federal adjusted gross income, for purposes of the Michigan per-
sonal income tax, would be net of any SBTA tax paid by the partnership. However, the
personal tax requires the add-back of any tax paid by the business levied on or measured
by income. MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 208.30(1)(b) (Supp. 1976). While the SBTA is
defined not to be a tax on net income, id. § 208.31(4), it is a tax measured by net income
and would have to be added back to arrive at income for purposes of the Michigan per-
sonal income tax. If it is added back to federal adjusted gross income, it is not deductible
for purposes of the Michigan personal income tax. Thus, the tax is levied without regard
for any SBTA tax paid by the partnership.
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holders. The amount of the credit cannot exceed the personal tax
liability and is not available if the entity has elected the 50% gross re-
ceipts limitation under SBTA section 208.31(2). 159
Thus, Michigan has levied its business tax on unincorporated and
incorporated businesses alike. It is one of a minority of states to do so
and the Michigan experience will undoubtedly influence other state
legislatures. Michigan's experience will probably help to determine
whether an entity tax on the income of unincorporated businesses con-
tinues to exist in only a minority of states or whether it becomes a
commonplace revenue-raising device.
III. THE Omo INCOME/FRANCHISE TAX
A. The Type of Tax Adopted
Ohio presently uses a hybrid method for the taxation of businesses.
The tax is the higher of (1) a franchise tax imposed on the corporation's
capital, surplus, and net worth, 160 (2) an income tax, 161 or (3) $50.162
In other words, the tax has the income, franchise, and minimum pay-
ment features discussed above. 163
Although it is not clear, perhaps the reason for the use of the hybrid
method is that the Ohio legislature sought to have the best of both worlds.
There had always been a franchise tax,'164 and when an income tax was
being considered the legislature decided to keep the franchise tax along
with the new income tax. If the income tax did not provide the revenue
that had been estimated, the franchise tax would be there to provide the
revenue it always had. If the income tax operated as planned, so much
the better. The legislature was probably wary of abandoning the as-
sured revenue of the franchise tax in favor of the then untested income
tax. Furthermore, 35 states still impose some combination of the two
taxes, 16 5 so the idea was not revolutionary. Five years later, both taxes
are still in effect.
B. Ohio's Multistate Income Allocation
Although Ohio did not adopt the Uniform Act, it is a member of the
MTC.16 6  Its allocation statute probably follows the MTC more closely
"" MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.269 (Supp. 1976).
160 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 9 5733.06(C) (Page 1973), used in conjunction with id.
§ 5733.05(A) (Page Supp. 1976).
161 Id. §§ 5733.06(A), (B) (Page 1973), used in conjunction with id. § 5733.05(B)
(Page Supp. 1976).
162 Id. § 5733.06 (Page 1973).
163 See notes 6-37 supra and accompanying text.
164 A brief history of the Ohio franchise/income tax is in P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES,
OHIO UNIT 10,205 (1975), which indicates that Ohio's first franchise tax was enacted in
1904.
165 See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
166 See P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNrr 5151 (1975); UDITPA,




than does Michigan's.'67 The one major change Ohio made in the MTC
approach was in the special treatment of non-business income. Unlike
Michigan, Ohio adopted the MTC treatment of non-business income with
its special methods for allocating rental, royalty, capital gain, interest,
and dividend income. The difference is that Ohio allocates all such
income by the special methods, regardless of its business or non-business
nature.'68 The effect of using the special methods for business income
as well, is difficult to evaluate for the same reasons outlined in the Mich-
igan discussion' and also poses additional problems.1
70
It seems odd that Ohio would adopt the non-business income formula
almost verbatim, 71 but fail to limit it to non-business income, as the
MTC does. At least one looseleaf service has stated that the provisions
for rental, royalty, capital gain, interest, and dividend income apply only
to non-business income. The service stated that the special provisions
apply to non-business income and that the three-factor formula allocates
business income. 7 2 The editors of the service, however, appear to have
been confused by the Ohio treatment since they referred to all rental,
royalty, dividend, and related income as non-business income. They
failed, as the statute does, to make the distinction between rental, royalty,
and dividend income that is business income and that which is non-
business income. They referred to all rental, royalty, dividend, and re-
lated income as non-business income when, under the Uniform Act
which they cite, such income could also be business income. The other
looseleaf service 173 and the Ohio Tax Commissioner, 174 consistent with
the statute, 75 do not make the distinction and allocate all rents, royal-
167 Compare OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05(B) (Page Supp. 1976) with P-H STATE
AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 11 6323-32 (1975) and UDITPA §§ 9-18. Also com-
pare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.051 (Page 1973) with P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES,
ALL STATES UNIT 6318-22 (1975) and UDITPA §§ 4-8 (covering allocation of non-
business income).
168 Compare P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6318-22 (1975)
with OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5733.051(A)(1)-(5), (7), (8) (Page 1973).
16' See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
"0 By not making the distinction, the statute causes problems for those businesses that
have rental, royalty, etc. income in the regular course of business. For them, those items
should be allocated as regular income (three-factor formula) and they are so allocated
under the MTC and the SBTA. Under those methods, such income is allocated specially
only if it represents non-business income. Since Ohio does not make the distinction, how-
ever, the income would be allocated specially regardless of its business/non-business na-
ture.
171 The most substantial deviation is in the treatment of dividends and interest.
Interest, because it is not specifically treated and is allocated under Ohio's three-factor
formula by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05(B) (Page 1973), and dividends which are
allocated using a simplified property factor, id. § 5733.051(A)(6).
Under the MTC method, both of these items would be allocated to the state of the
business' commercial domicile. P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 6321
(1975). Evaluating the effect of these changes is difficult, though it would appear more
substantial in the case of Ohio, since it involves all interest and dividend income rather
than only the non-business portion, as in Michigan.
172 CCH STATE TAX REP., OHIO 10-340, -342 (1975).
173 See P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, OHIO UNIT 1 10,347 (1974).
174 CCH STATE TAX REP., OHIO UNIT 1189 (1975) (instructions for the preparation of
Schedule C to the Ohio franchise tax return).
17s There is no mention of these terms in the provision for allocation of rents, royalties,
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ties, and related income specially. By following the MTC word for word
except for the key business/non-business income distinction, the Ohio
legislature has deviated from the MTC and caused some confusion as to
why the change was made and how the statute should be applied. A
change in the language to comply with the MTC would resolve this
problem.
Similar problems exist in the Ohio three-factor formula itself. Ohio's
formula substantially follows the MTC method. 76 The property factor
differs in that it excludes Ohio pollution control facilities; 77 but this does
not appear to be a major deviation. Ohio's definition of "sales," as used
in the sales factor, varies slightly from the MTC definition 78 and might
also be dismissed as of little significance, except that closer analysis
reveals a substantial departure from the intent of the MTC. Further, it
appears that it may have been a result unintended by the legislature.
The Ohio sales factor is defined as:
a fraction the numerator of which is the value of business done,
measured by sales of tangible personal property in this state
• . . and the denominator of which is the total value of its busi-
ness done, measured by sales of tangible personal property by
the corporation everywhere during such year.17 9
This definition on its face appears to include in the sales factor only
sales of tangible personal property with no mention of sales of intangibles.
It would appear, therefore, that the value of business done is to be mea-
sured only by sales of tangible personal property. While it could be ar-
gued that the emphasis should be on value of business done, and that
sales of tangible personalty is only illustrative, the statute, standing
alone, appears to lend itself better to the first interpretation since it so
clearly specifies sales of tangible personalty.
The problem with this literal reading arises when the quoted section
is read in conjunction with the definition of "tangible personal property,"
which states in part: "[t]o the extent that the value of business done
in this state is measured by sales of tangible personal property ... "180
This implies that the value of business done may be measured by some-
thing other than sales of tangible personalty, despite the conclusions
reached above. Sales of other than tangible personalty (intangibles) are
also defined in the same section, but there is no reference to "value of
business done.''8 Thus, there is nothing in the statute which links
sales of intangibles to the sales factor or to the "value of business done"
etc., see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.051 (Page 1973), or in the section which defines
terms generally, id. § 5733.04 (Page Supp. 1976).
176 Compare P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT T 6323, 6332 (1975)
with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05(B) (Page Supp. 1976).
177 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05 (B)(2)(a) (Page 1973).
178 Compare P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 1 6330, 6331 (1975)
with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05(B)(2)(c) (Page Supp. 1976).






and thus to the sales factor definition. This results in confusion about
whether the Ohio sales factor includes anything other than sales of tangi-
ble personalty. By following the language of the MTC almost word for
word, 8" and yet specifically deviating from the unambiguous MTC
language' 1 3 in order to discuss sales of tangible personalty, the Ohio
legislature may well have excluded sales of intangibles from the sales
factor. At the very least, such a deviation creates an ambiguity in the
statute.
Despite the fact that the legislature revised this section in 1973, it
failed to resolve this problem leaving the language unchanged.
18 4
Perhaps, though, it did not feel a clarification was necessary since the
sales factor is now treated as including only sales of tangible personalty,
consistent with the strict statutory construction. 185  Nevertheless, a
small change in the language would bring the statute into compliance
with the MTC and resolve any questions that may remain.
C. The Determination of "Taxable Income"
Like Michigan, Ohio begins its computation of income with federal
taxable income. 18  The statute then lists nine adjustments to arrive at
income for Ohio purposes.8 7 The adjustments cover dividends received,
capital losses, certain methods of accounting, and taxes on intangible
property. 8 8  Such adjustments are typical of those made by most
states.8 9 One Ohio adjustment that merits attention is the net operat-
ing loss deduction. As originally enacted, the deduction was rather
limited in scope, 190 but allowed a carryforward until the loss was fully
182 See note 167 supra.
183 "The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of the
taxpayer in this State ...... P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT q1 6329
(1968) (emphasis added). This certainly includes sales of both tangible and intangible
personalty. Those items are defined separately, id. J 6330, 6331, as they are in Ohio.
154 The former text is found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05(C) (Page 1973),
the revisions in id. 5733.05(B)(2)(c) (Page Supp. 1976).
185 See P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, OHIO UNIT 10,353 (1976) and instructions
for 1975 tax returns contained in id. 15,825.
A recent case involved a taxpayer that contested the provisions of the sales factor used
in determining the Ohio franchise tax. The statute contained provisions similar to the
ones discussed in the text. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05(A)(4) (Page 1973)
with id. § 5733.05(B)(2)(c) (Page Supp. 1976). The court found the statutory sections
mutually exclusive as to this taxpayer, ambiguous and, because of the ambiguity, resolved
the conflict in favor of the taxpayer. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kosydar, 44 Ohio St. 2d 208, 339
N.E.2d 820 (1975). Although the case does not resolve the problems presented in the
text, it indicates a willingness on the part of the Ohio Supreme Court to resolve statutory
conflicts in favor of the taxpayer. If the legislature wishes to avoid a similar adverse
ruling on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.05(B)(2)(c) (Page Supp. 1976), it would seem
that the conflict discussed should be resolved.
186 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.04(I) (Page Supp. 1976).
187 Id. The figure is apportioned among the states under id. §§ 5733.05(B)(2),
5733.051 (Page 1973).
188 Id. § 5733.04(I) (Page Supp. 1976).
189 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 280A(b), (c) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. TAX LAW §§
612(b), (c) (McKinney 1975).
180 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.04(I)(1) (Page 1973). The section precluded the use
of the deduction until the corporation paid its tax on the net income base. If the company
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utilized, without the usual time period limitations.19' Two years later,
the Ohio legislature changed the provision to allow its use in a broader
range of circumstances and to limit the carryforward to five years. 9
2
No carryback of the loss is permitted. 193
The second unusual thing about Ohio's adjustments to federal taxable
income is a provision noticeable by its absence: a requirement that any
Ohio income/franchise tax deducted in computing federal taxable income
be added back for purposes of computing the Ohio income/franchise
tax.' 94  The problem is in the sequence of the computation. In the
computation of its federal taxable income, a company is rightfully en-
titled to deduct its Ohio tax as an ordinary and necessary expense of the
business. 95 In order to determine its Ohio tax, however, the company
must have already computed its federal taxable income (the Ohio tax
computation begins with federal taxable income). The company cannot
compute its federal tax until it computes its Ohio tax; it cannot com-
pute its Ohio tax until it computes its federal tax. The problem is illus-
trated in detail in the note below, 196 but the consequences of this
incurred losses and computed its tax based upon the franchise base (which it would since
that would yield a higher tax due to the loss situation), it would receive no deduction.
Not until income increased such that the income base was higher than the franchise base,
would the deduction become available. Of course, that could be several years hence.
191 Id.
"I Id. (Page Supp. 1976).
193 Id.
"I See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.04(l) (Page Supp. 1976).
195 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 and related regulations.
19 Assume a taxpayer with $100,000 of pre-tax income and an Ohio income tax rate
of 10%. The federal tax liability would be computed thus:
$100,000 Pre-tax income
10,000 Less: Ohio income/franchise tax at 10%
$90,000 Federal taxable income
Now compute the Ohio tax (assuming no other Ohio adjustments):
$90,000 Federal taxable income (computed above)
Ohio tax at 10%
The company has two different Ohio tax liabilities: $10,000 for federal tax purposes
and $9,000 for Ohio purposes. Clearly both cannot be correct and, in fact, neither is. By
means of a simultaneous equation the taxpayer should have computed its Ohio tax liability
to be $9,091. The formula that yields this liability is X=.10($100,000-X) when X= Ohio
tax liability. The proof of the answer is:
$100,000 Pre-tax income
9,091 Less: Ohio tax
$90,909 Federal taxable income
Now compute the Ohio tax:
$90 909 Federal taxable income (computed above)
$9,091 Ohio tax at 10%
The company has the same liability for state and federal purposes. Its Ohio tax deduc-
tion for federal tax purposes equals its Ohio tax liability, a situation which did not exist
in the first example.
Assuming that $9,091 is the correct Ohio tax liability, note that in the first example
both federal and Ohio tax liabilities were understated. In the first example the federal
taxable income was $90,000; in the simultaneous equation it was $90,909. Thus, federal
taxable income was understated by $909. The Ohio tax in the simultaneous equation was





omission should be noted. First, in order to properly compute its federal
and Ohio taxes, a company must use a simultaneous equation; second,
the omission reduces both Ohio and federal taxes from what they would
be if there were an add-back of the Ohio tax. It is difficult to believe
the omission was intended because of the complexities it leads to and the
revenues that are lost. Therefore, it appears to be an inadvertant error
that should be rectified.
D. "Persons" Subject to Taxation
The entities reached by Ohio taxes are the traditional ones taxed by
the majority of the states. The income of trusts is allocated to the bene-
ficiaries and then subject to the personal income tax. 197 Ohio estates
are also subject to the personal income tax,""8 and the franchise tax is
levied solely on corporations. 9 9 Thus, unincorporated entities escape
Ohio taxation at the entity level. There is little innovative in subjecting
only these "persons" to taxation.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SBTA AND THE OHIO TAX
A. The Type of Tax
As has been noted, Michigan adopted the income-based SBTA as
the primary tax on business activity within the state, while Ohio retains
the hybrid income/franchise tax. As previously discussed, the faults of
the franchise tax are: It strongly emphasizes the importance of the finan-
cial structure of the corporation, may not share in the long-term growth
of the company, can preclude the taxation of unincorporated businesses,
and often has little regard for the ability to pay doctrine.
The advantages of the income tax were also discussed, 20 and it was
concluded that because the tax is based upon ability to pay it is probably
the most equitable for the taxpayer. While one may dispute the asserted
advantages of the income tax and differ with Michigan's reliance on it,
it seems clear that Ohio's continued use of both income and franchise
taxes is burdensome and unnecessary. The retention of both taxes is
unnecessary because, after five years, the Ohio legislature should be
If the Ohio tax were simply added back, all of the above problems would be eliminated:
$100,000 Pre-tax income
10,000 Less: Ohio tax at 10%
$90,000 Federal taxable income
10,000 Add back Ohio tax deductions
$100,000 Ohio taxable income
$10,000 Ohio tax at 10%
Under this method the Ohio tax is the same for federal and state purposes and there is no
need for the use of a simultaneous equation.
Michigan incorporates the add-back in MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 208.9(3) (Supp.
1976).
197 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.23 (Page Supp. 1976).
19s Id. § 5747.01(S).
191 Id. § 5733.06 (Page 1973).
2" See notes 6-37 supra and accompanying text.
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able to estimate the revenue from the income tax operating alone. 20 1
\With appropriate rate changes, present revenue could be maintained by
relying on the income tax alone. The use of both taxes is burdensome
because the taxpayer must compute its liability under two separate and
very different kinds of taxes and then pay only one of them - the higher
one. Thus, in all fairness to the taxpayers, it would seem that Ohio
should rely on one tax, the income tax.
B. Multistate Income Allocation
Both Michigan and Ohio have adopted the fundamentals of the MTC.
The problem with the statutes enacted by the two states is that both of
them make changes in the MTC language, an approach that can create
a significant impact upon individual business taxpayers. Michigan made
changes in the sales factor, in allocation for special industries, and in the
treatment of non-business income. Ohio's alocation statute follows the
MTC more closely. The only notable deviation is that the MTC's special
treatment of non-business income items is not limited by Ohio to non-
business income, but extends to all income. It appears that the Ohio
changes have a less significant impact on taxpayers than do Michigan's,
but this is principally because the Ohio changes are confined to one
portion of the MTC. W\ithout detailed statistics on business income
within each state, it is difficult to evaluate the effect of the changes made
by the two states. It is clear, however, that an\y deviation from the MTC
thwarts the basic purpose of a uniform allocation system, thus defeating
the ultimate goal of the MTC - reasonable and equal treatment of
individual taxpayers in all states.
C. The Determination of "Taxable Income"
The nature of the adjustments to federal taxable income to arrive
at Michigan taxable income have already been discussed.20 2  It was
noted that a full cost deduction is allowed in the year of purchase, no
del)reciation is taken on those assets, and no deduction of labor and
interest expenses is permitted.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of these adjustments is that they
vary from the usual notions about the definition of taxable income.
While all states have their own definition of income, most adopt the
federal definition and make only minor adjustments. The items ad-
justed usually represent a relatively small percentage of an enterprise's
total income.203  Few such adjustments make changes in the deduction
of the major expenses of the business - things like labor, interest, and
capital asset costs. Because of these major adjustments, SBTA taxable
201 It would be interesting to learn howv much revenue is generated by the franchise
tax computation alone. Unfortunately, Ohio's published data only show the total income/
franchise tax revenue. See, e.g., 1973 OHIo STATE AUDITOR ANNUAL REP. 9.
212 See notes 119-54 supra and accompanying text.
21 E.g., adjustments to dividends received, certain taxes paid, royalties, unusual finan-





income may vary widely from income for financial accounting, federal
tax, or other state's tax purposes. In fact, the SBTA's definition is so
different, that the tax approaches the outer limits of what can be regarded
as an income tax. It has taken on many of the characteristics of a
value-added tax. 04  As a result, many of the attributes and benefits
derived from the use of an income tax 205. may not apply to the SBTA.
Not the least of these differences may be the possible infringement of
the ability to pay maxim.206 Disallowance of a deduction for the cost of
labor and for interest appears to violate the maxim by imposing a tax
irrespective of significant, legitimate costs of the business. Allowing a
full deduction for the cost of capital assets will encourage long-term
financing of such assets because a full deduction can be achieved with
minimal cash paid and little change in ability to pay.20 7  The effect of
these adjustments may well result in the characterization of the SBTA
as not truly an income tax, but rather as a hybrid of income and value-
added taxes.
It is doubtful that this definition of taxable income will become a
model for other states. The value-added tax has not been favored in
this country largely because it substantially deviates from the taxes
presently imposed. The complexity of the income tax is frequently
criticized. Mixing the income tax with the elements of a value-added
tax when the benefits are, as yet, uncertain would seem to be a risk few
legislatures would be willing to undertake. Thus, unless the benefits of
the Michigan income/value-added tax are demonstrated to be clearly
superior to those of any other tax, that form of taxation will likely re-
main indigenous to Michigan.
The Ohio definition of taxable income is remarkably typical of that
of other states. The federal definition has been adopted by Ohio with
only minor adjustments. One of the adjustments made by Ohio is worth
reviewing, that is, the rather short net operating loss carryforward limita-
204 The denial of a deduction for labor and interest effectively means that the value
of those items is taxed. The taxation of such items as measures of the value added to
the final product, is common to value-added taxes. See generally R. WAGNER, R. FREE!,IAN,
C. McCLURE, N. TtRE & E. SCIFF, PERSPECTIVES ON TAX REFORM - DEATH TAXES,
TAX LOOPHOLES AND THE VALUE-ADDED TAX 165-316 (1974). The Michigan )epartment of
Treasury has also recognized this characteristic of the tax. Single Business Tax Division,
Michigan Dep't of Treasury, The New Single Business Tax 1 (Dec. 5, 1975), on file in
the offices of Cleveland State Law Review. See also Barnes, The Business Receipts Tax, 32
MICH. ST. B.J. 31 (Oct. 1953).
205 See notes 6-37 supra and accompanying text.
206 Id.
207 In such a situation, the taxpayer receives a full cost deduction in one year and is
only required to pay for the asset to the extent not financed by the loan. l)epreciation
deductions would more closely match the deduction taken for the cost of the asset with
the cash paid over the life of the loan. Conversely, however, the use of depreciation
penalizes the taxpayer that pays cash for assets since the deductions would be deferred
over the depreciable life of the asset even though all of the cash is paid at the time of
purchase. In any case, a full cost deduction allows deductions equal to or greater than
the cash paid for the asset, on a year-by-year basis, whether the cash is paid all in the
year of purchase or spread over the life of a loan. Depreciation often allows a leduc-
tion in the first year of an amount less than the cash paid, .vhen the taxpayer pays cash
for assets rather than financing them. Thus, a full cost deduction is more "generous'"
than depreciation in terms of the ability to pay maxim.
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tion of five years. Because of its restrictive nature, businesses which
sustain large losses for more than one or two years will often be unable
to utilize the full carryforward before its expiration. Thus, the short
time limitation operates to restrict the benefits of the carryforward to
those businesses that suffer losses for only one or two years. Assuming
that the policy behind the operating loss carryover is a sound one,2 °s it
would seem that Ohio should consider bringing its carryover period in
line with the federal (eight years)20 9 or the Michigan (ten years)2 10
time limitations.
D. "Persons" Subject to Taxation
The imposition of the SBTA on unincorporated businesses is one of
the unique aspects of the new Michigan tax. In conjunction with the
changes in the Michigan personal income tax, the parts of the SBTA
applicable to unincorporated entities appear v.ell-designed and effective.
The fact that a state as large as Michigan has chosen to tax these entities
when redesigning its entire business tax structure, should induce other
states to consider such a tax. The advantage of the tax is that it pro-
vides another source of revenue for financially strained state govern-
ments, while requiring little legislative effort. Only minor changes in
present business and personal income tax structures would be needed to
effectuate the new tax in most states. The tax is an especially effective
deterrent to the operation of unincorporated businesses by non-resident
owners. Often personal income taxes are ineffective to tax the owners
of these businesses because of their out-of-state residence, and the busi-
ness income is not taxed at the entity level because the business is not
208 The policy is to equalize the treatment of taxpayers regardless of the pattern of
their earnings over the years. For example, A and B earn the same total taxable income
over a four year period, except that A's income varies widely from year to year. The
tax rate is 10. Compare the overall results with and without the operating loss carry-
over. The loss is carried here, until fully utilized. If a part of it had expired before A
could fully utilize it, the results would appear more like those for A without a carryover
provision at all.
19X1 19X2 19X3 19X4 Total
A-Taxable Income $(50,000) $100,000 $(25,000) $75,000 = $100,000
Tax-10, no
carryforward -0- 10,000 -0- 7,500 = 17,500
Tax-l0, with
carryforward -0- 5,000 -0- 5,000 10,000
B-Taxable Income 25,000 25,000 25,000 25,000 = 100,000
Tax-10g, with or
without carryforward 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 = 10,000
If the state allows carryforwards, both taxpayers pay the same total tax on the same total
income. If there is no carryforward (or if it expires before utilized), A, as illustrated, pays
a higher tax due only to the cyclical nature of its business, even though its income through-
out the period is the same as the more stable B.
See generally Barley & Levy, Loss Carryback and Carryover Provision: Effectiveness
and Economic Implication, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 173 (1975) comparing the "generosity" of
the federal operating loss carryover with that used by other countries. Presumably, the
analysis could be extended to compare the carryover provisions of one state with another.
209 INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 172(b)(1)(A)(i), (B).
210 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.23(e) (Supp. 1976). Subchapter S corporations are
taxed at the federal level much as partnerships are, even though they are organized as




incorporated. The tax on unincorporated businesses solves this problem
by taxing the income of the business regardless of the owner's state of
residence. It would appear that as states search for new sources of
revenue, the tax on the income of unincorporated businesses may be-
come more common, particularly if Michigan's tax proves successful.
Widespread taxation of the income of unincorporated businesses
would, however, diminish the present attractiveness of that form of
organization. Certainly one of the current advantages of the unincor-
porated form is the fact that its income has been ignored by the state
and federal tax collectors. If this tax advantage is removed, it would
seem that more businesses might be attracted to the corporate form of
organization.
E. Interest on Underpayment and Overpayment of Tax
The SBTA provides that if the taxpayer underpays its tax, interest
will be assessed on the deficiency at the rate of three-fourths of 1%211
per month,2 12 or 9% per year. The interest runs from the date the
amount became due.213  Similar provisions are found in the Ohio
214
and federal income tax statutes.21
5
The use of deficiency assessments 216 prompts two questions. Are
211 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 208.81(2), (3) (Supp. 1976). The statute requires that
the interest be assessed without regard to the reason for the deficiency, but section
208.82(4) allows the Commissioner to suspend the interest if the taxpayer demonstrates
reasonable cause for the deficiency.
212 By assessing the interest at the rate of 3/4 of 1% per month, the statute raises the
possibility of compound interest assessments, i.e., charging interest on the unpaid interest
of a previous month. For instance, if T is delinquent on a $100,000 payment, interest
for the first month will be assessed at 3/4 of 1%, or $100,000 x 3/4 of 1% = $750. The
question is then whether interest for the second month should be assessed on $100,000
(simple interest) or on $100,750 (compound interest). The difference in methods can
produce substantial differences in the final total.
r. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6601(e)(2) specifies that there shall be no compounding
of federal tax assessments.
The Michigan statute does not make such a provision, so presumably the Commissioner
could compound if he so chose. In general, however, the law does not favor the com-
pounding of interest, although most cases arise out of contractual relationships rather than
taxpayer deficiencies. Nevertheless, as a result of the disfavored status, there would
probably be a presumption that the Michigan statute did not intend compounding since
it was not expressly provided for. See United States v. Glasser, 287 F.2d 433 (7th Cir.
1961) on federal compounding. There are no Michigan cases on point.
Ohio assesses its interest on a 6% "per annum" basis. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.26(A)
(Page 1973). In view of the foregoing discussion, the Ohio statute appears to imply
simple interest, though there are no Ohio cases on point.
213 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 208.81(2), (3) (Supp. 1976).
214 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.26(A) (Page 1973).
215 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6621(b). Originally the rate was 9%, but it was recently
reduced to 7%. Rev. Rul. 75-487, 1975-2 CUM. BULL. 488.
216 Whether an additional tax is actually interest or, in fact, a penalty depends upon
how the statute itself treats the assessment. United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304, 309
(1924). Since the Michigan statute refers to the 9% rate as "interest," MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 208.81(2), (3) (Supp. 1976), and there are other sections which provide "penalties,"
id. §§ 208.81(4), (5), the 9% rate appears to be a charge only for interest.
Interest is defined as "[t]he compensation allowed .. . for the ...detention of money."
1 BoUvIER's LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914). In this case the interest is compensation
for the detention of a tax payment. Presumably, the state intends only to be made whole
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deficiency assessments effective in motivating the taxpayer to remit
its payments on a timely basis? Are such assessments fair to the tax-
payer? The first question is particularly important with respect to
business taxes due to the large sums of money remitted by business
taxpayers. Unlike their employees, businesses determine their own
estimated tax payments21 7 and, thus, have a greater opportunity to
manipulate and delay tax payments. A properly designed deficiency
statute should minimize this problem.
The nature of the problem is readily illustrated by the following
hypothetical. Suppose business taxpayer T is required to remit a
$1,000,000 payment to the state on January 1. Suppose also that T is
in a state that assesses only 6% interest218 on delinquent payments and
that T would have to pay 12% interest to borrow the money for the pay-
ment in the marketplace. 219  T, with one eye on the deficiency rate of
6% and the other on the market rate of 12%, decides that it would be
prudent tax planning to remit only $900,000 of the $1,000,000 payment
that is due. The difference in the rates looks "too good to pass up"
and T has only underpayed by 10% ($100,000), an amount that is not
likely to draw the attention of the state tax department.
If T can delay paying the $100,000 for a full year, it has a potential
savings of $6,000.220 Thus, by setting the rate too low, the state has ac-
tually encouraged T to defer its payments as long as possible. It is less
expensive to "borrow" from the state than to secure a loan in the market-
place.
The higher the prevailing market rate, the more lucrative this bit of
tax planning becomes. Likewise, the larger the amount due, the more
appealing is the delay in payment. 221 If the statutory rate were set at
by the assessment, not to make a profit or to penalize the taxpayer, since other sections
provide for penalties.
21' Businesses are required to make estimated tax payments throughout the year if
they anticipate tax liabilities in excess of the minimum set forth in the statute. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 6154; MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 208.71 (Supp. 1976); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 5733.021 (Page Supp. 1976).
Employees' "estimated payments" are determined by the employer and withheld from the
employees' paychecks. Ir'-r. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3402; (id. § 6015 also requires certain
individuals to estimate their own taxes in addition to the "estimate" made by the employer);
MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 206.351 (Supp. 1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.06(A)
(Page 1973).
zs As Ohio does. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.26(A) (Page 1973).
219 The key indicator of the cost of money in the money market is the "prime rate of
interest." It is defined as "[t]he interest rate most closely approximating the riskless
or 'pure' rate for money, i.e., ...highest quality credit. . . .Rates on business loans of
banks reflect . .. the size of the loan ...maturities of loans . .. and geographical varia-
tions. . . . MUNN's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKINC AND FINANCE 749 (7th ed. F. Garcia
1973). Thus, the prime rate is that charged to the bank's best customers. Loans with a
higher risk level may involve rates of up to prime + 4%. With prime rates reaching levels
as high as 12% in recent years, businesses have been paying 15-16% for money in the market.
220 The potential tax savings is computed by taking the difference between the interest
rate T must pay the state (6%) and what it would pay to borrow the funds (12%), times
the amount to be borrowed (not remitted): 12% - 6% = 6%; 6% x $100,000 = $6,000 savings.
22' The hypothetical is even more appealing if T can deduct the cost of the interest
assessed for tax purposes. Of course, T could have deducted the cost of any interest paid




the market rate or higher, T would rather pay the state since it is no
more expensive than it is to borrow the money.
Despite the attractiveness of this tax planning device, T is somewhat
limited in how much it can borrow from the state. If T consistently de-
fers payments, the state may invoke an additional penalty for negligence
or even fraud.222  Furthermore, at the end of its taxable year, when re-
mittance of the full tax for the year is required, T must remit the full
amount due. Therefore, this type of borrowing is restricted to a one-year
duration. Of course, T can resume the "loan" by underpaying the esti-
mated tax payment for the first quarter of the following year. Neverthe-
less, by fixing a deficiency rate in the statute, Michigan and Ohio have
opened the door to abuses of the kind illustrated.
This problem can be avoided by an annual legislative review of defi-
ciency interest rates in relation to market rates. If the statutory rates
are set to equal or exceed the market rates, there will be no benefit to
taxpayers who delay tax payments. In view of the widely fluctuating inter-
est rates in recent years, such a legislative review appears necessary if
the statute is to operate as intended. If the legislature is unwilling to
assume the burden of annual review, it could delegate the duty to an
administrative agency. Relatively simple guidelines could be provided for
the agency, with the prime rate of interest as an indicator. The federal
tax system employs an administrative review procedure.
2 23
Secondly, it must be asked whether it is fair to require taxpayers to
pay interest on deficiency assessments. As a practical matter, such
assessments merely reimburse the state for the use of money to which it
was rightfully entitled. Any other result would reward the tardy tax-
payer and penalize those making a good faith effort to comply. Further-
more, the government is equally fair with the taxpayer in the converse
situation. The Michigan and federal statutes require those governments
to pay interest to the taxpayer on any overpayments at the same rate
charged for deficiencies if the refund is not made within 45 days of a
est on federal tax deficiencies is deductible for federal tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 70-284,
1970-1 CUM. BULL. 34. T can also deduct any state tax deficiency interest assessments on
its federal return. 2 P-H 1976 FED. TAXES 13,023. Since the state taxes are based on
federal taxable income, by deducting the state deficiency assessment at the federal level,
T has also deducted it for state purposes unless the state tax specifically requires that
the assessment be added back to income. Michigan provides that all taxes imposed by the
SBTA and deducted for federal tax purposes must be added back to income before figuring
the SBTA tax. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.9(3) (Supp. 1976). "Taxes" are defined to
include interest on taxes. Id. § 208.8. Thus, interest deficiency assessments on SBTA
taxes could be deducted for federal tax purposes but not for SBTA purposes. (The SBTA
also disallows deductions for interest in general. See note 154 supra and accompanying
text.)
Ohio does not provide for the adding back of its own tax or the interest thereon. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.04(l) (Page Supp. 1976). Therefore, T would deduct Ohio
interest assessments on its federal tax return, and this deduction would flow through to its
Ohio return. Thus, indirectly, Ohio does allow for the deduction of its own interest as-
sessments, making the hypothetical even more attractive.
222 For penalties in Michigan, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 208.81(4), (5)
(Supp. 1976). Ohio does not provide for such penalties. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5733 (Page Supp. 1976).
223 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6621.
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claim for it.2 24  Ohio is even more generous, granting 6% interest from
the date of the overpayment. 22 5 This approach, however, places an un-
duly heavy burden on the Ohio Tax Commissioner to review and process
payments quickly in order to reduce interest paid. 226  A statute similar
to Michigan's appears more reasonable in view of the number of refund
claims processed and the complexity of determining their accuracy.
Thus, in a market with fluctuating interest rates, fixed rates in a
state's tax deficiency statute may lead to results inconsistent with the
intended goals of compensating the state for late tax remittances and
motivating timely payments by taxpayers. The flexible rates in the fed-
eral statute are an effective and practical answer to the problem and
both Michigan and Ohio should note this rather simple solution.
F. The Rate of Tax
The SBTA tax rate is 2.35% of the adjusted tax base of the tax-
payer.227  The proponents of the tax estimated that it would generate
revenues of about $800 million, approximately the revenue of the taxes
it replaced; 22 nevertheless, there is already a proposal in the Michi-
gan legislature to raise the rate to 2.5%.22 9
The imposition of a 2.35% tax is not terribly significant in relation to
the 48% imposed by the federal tax and the rates of other industrial states
which often range over 10%.23 1 It must be remembered, however, that
the other tax rates are imposed on net income. Michigan's is imposed
on the Michigan tax base, in which there is no deduction for compensa-
tion or interest. The tax base can range as high as 50% of gross receipts
before any relief is offered by the statute. In such a case, 2.35% of 50%
of gross receipts can yield a much larger tax than 10% of net income.
Thus, it is not possible to compare other states' statutory rates with the
SBTA's because their definition of taxable income is so different. In the
face of this difference, the economic impact of the tax can only be ef-
fectively judged after the tax has been in effect for at least a year.
V. CONCLUSION
With the enactment of the SBTA, Michigan has become one of the few
states to develop an overall scheme for the taxation of business activity.
Rather than attempt to change the patchwork system that had been in
224 Id. § 6611(e) (45 days after the date the return is due, or 45 days after the date it is
filed, if that is later); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.97(3) (Supp. 1976).
225 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.26(A) (Page 1973).
226 This gives rise to the converse of the first hypothetical contained in the text. If
the market rate falls below the rate which Ohio pays on overpayments (6%), T may overpay
its tax to earn 6% on its money, a rate better than that available in the market. Further,
it earns interest from the date of the overpayment. Again, an argument for allowing the
rate to be adjusted with the market rate changes.
227 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 208.31(1) (Supp. 1976).
228 Single Business Tax Division, Michigan Dep't of Treasury, The New Single Busi-
ness Tax 1 (Dec. 5, 1975), on file in the offices of the Cleveland State Law Review.
z22 P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, SPECIAL MICHICAN REPORT 3 (1976).




effect, the legislature repealed the variety of business taxes then in use in
order to substitute a single, well-designed tax. While the merits of the tax
Michigan enacted may be debated, all should agree that such a compre-
hensive re-evaluation is admirable.
The SBTA has the major characteristics of an income tax, yet there
are adjustments disallowing interest and compensation expenses as deduc-
tions. This gives the SBTA some of the qualities of a value-added tax
and is certain to provoke discussion. Industries and businesses with
significant interest and compensation expenditures will find the provisions
less than appealing. Along with the full cost deduction for capital assets
acquired, the least that can be said about the SBTA is that it is very dif-
ferent from what is in use in other states. Because of the SBTA's unique-
ness, the effect of the novel provisions must await at least the first year
of experience. Perhaps the greatest disappointment is that Michigan
has refused to comply with the MTC which equitably allocates the in-
come of multistate businesses. These businesses will continue to be un-
fairly taxed because states like Michigan refuse to adopt without modi-
fication the reasonable solution provided by the MTC.
The SBTA serves as a model for Ohio to the extent that it advocates
re-evaluation and streamlining of the business tax structure. Like
Michigan, Ohio's business tax structure has evolved over a long period
of time. As additional revenues were needed, additional taxes were levied
and additional complications arose. Perhaps the best example of this
lack of planning is the continued use of the tax on corporations based
upon the higher of the franchise tax or the income tax. This imposes
the cost and inconvenience of two separate computations on every tax-
payer within the state. It would appear that the system could be greatly
simplified if the state would rely on the income tax alone. Appropriate
rate changes could be used to maintain the present level of revenues.
Whether the SBTA serves as a model tax for Ohio in other respects
is doubtful. Ohio already has a well-designed income tax. The SBTA
is complex, both in practice and theory, and the benefits to be obtained
over a well-designed income tax are questionable. Whether the SBTA
has some of the benefits of both income and value-added taxes or the ad-
vantages of neither, remains to be seen. The one clear problem with the
SBTA is its complexity. It would seem that Ohio would be better ad-
vised to repeal its franchise tax and make relatively minor changes in
its income tax, rather than change its entire system to one such as the
SBTA, in which the complexities and problems are assured and the bene-
fits remain to be proven.
ROBERT M. WILSON
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